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ABSTRACT 
Corporate reporting has changed from the traditional form of reporting which covered financial 
information only to the modern form of reporting called integrated reporting which covers, 
financial, corporate governance and sustainability information. The levels of corporate disclosure 
among corporate entities within any country and between countries are thus likely to have been 
affected by this change. 
 
Motivated by the IMF/World Bank (2006) that observed that corporate reporting improved in 
Botswana during the previous five years, without indicating what the actual level was or how it 
compares with that of other countries; this study sought to determine the actual level of corporate 
disclosure of two samples of companies: 23 companies listed on the Botswana Stock Exchange 
(BSE) and the top 40 companies (by market capitalisation) that are listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE). The study also shows how the two levels of corporate disclosure 
compare. 
 
This study is qualitative and descriptive by design; and involves analysing the content of the 
corporate annual report of each company in a sample using a corporate disclosure checklist; and 
determining the level of corporate disclosure for each sample of companies. The process ends 
with a comparative analysis of the levels of corporate disclosure of the companies from the two 
samples. 
 
Consistent with the IMF/World Bank report, the study revealed that the level of corporate 
disclosure in the BSE sample was low but increasing. However, the increase in the level of 
corporate disclosure varied from sector to sector and the specific information items. The study 
also showed that integrated reporting was not practised at all by the companies in the BSE 
sample. 
 
Comparatively, companies in the JSE sample had a higher level of corporate disclosure than that 
of companies in the BSE sample; and the rate of increase was much higher than that in the BSE 
sample. The study further found integrated reporting practiced in the entire JSE sample, although 
at different levels. 
xi 
 
 
This study also noted that although in principle it is sensible to benchmark from the best, other 
fundamental factors need to be considered before carrying out the exercise. Furthermore, the 
study indicated that the prevalent low level of corporate disclosure in the BSE sample was 
evidence that the corporate reporting environment in which the BSE lies was not conducive for 
the theories of corporate disclosure to fully explain corporate disclosure. 
 
A number of recommendations were made including establishing corporate disclosure indices 
and creation of a corporate environment in which all the theories discussed in the study can 
explain corporate disclosure. 
 
This study contributes to the literature on cross-country corporate disclosure and cautions 
companies with low levels of corporate disclosure not to embark on benchmarking without 
creating an environment conducive for corporate reporting. The study also offers useful insights 
to policymakers in Botswana and South Africa; and stimulates further research on cross-country 
corporate disclosure. The academia too will be able to identify areas for further research from 
this study. 
 
Key words: Financial reporting, mandatory disclosure, integrated reporting, cross-country, 
corporate disclosure, sustainability reporting, environmental disclosure, corporate governance 
reporting, information asymmetry, contextual disclosure, social and responsibility accounting, 
voluntary corporate disclosure, accounting theories. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
In Botswana investors provide finance to entities in the form of equity capital and loans 
while creditors provide credit to entities by supplying goods and services to them on 
credit. The public, on the other hand, provides labour to entities as well as the market for 
the entities’ products. The government relies on entities for finance in the form of taxes 
levied and information in return for providing them with an environment that is 
conducive to business. These actual and potential parties which interact with entities are 
the entities’ stakeholders (IOD, 2009; IRC, 2011:5). 
 
As the entity’s stakeholders interact with the entity they make decisions which require 
relevant information about the entity’s performance and governance. Investors for 
example require information about the entity’s profitability and risk in order to make 
investment decisions (Gibson, 2001:179). Lenders, in making lending decisions, also 
require information about the entity’s ability to repay loans and pay interest thereon 
(Vorster, Koornhof, Oberholster&Koppeschaar, 2013; IASB, 2013). 
 
On their part, suppliers require information about the entity’s liquidity in order to decide 
whether or not to grant credit to the entity (Rees, 1995:4-5, Everingham& Lomax, 
2005:4-5). Employees require information about job opportunities, job security as well as 
the entity’s ability to pay an acceptable remuneration package (Belkaoui, 2000:32, 
Gibson, 2001:179). The government needs information with which to assess the entity’s 
compliance with existing regulations as well as for economic management purposes 
(Glautier &Underdown, 2001:19; Everingham & Lomax, 2005:4-5). The entity’s 
customers require information about the entity’s ability to continue supplying them with 
goods and services at a reasonable price. Lastly, the public requires information about the 
entity’s social responsibility (Glautier &Underdown, 20011:19; Everingham &Lomax, 
2005:4-5) and environmental accountability (Clarke, 2004:25; Lund-Thomsen, 2005). 
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While financial intermediaries such as financial analysts, the financial press and credit 
rating agencies may provide the information required by the firm’s stakeholders, the 
common method by which such information is communicated to stakeholders is through 
financial reporting and disclosure by management (Singhvi& Desai, 1971:129; Healy, & 
Palepu, 2004:403). This is usually by way of corporate annual reports. The entity’s 
corporate annual report contains both mandatory and voluntary information about the 
firm’s performance, position and governance. Such reports, although not specifically 
addressed to particular stakeholders, are believed to provide the information that 
stakeholders require (IASB, 2013). 
 
However, communication to stakeholders through corporate annual reports has a number 
of shortcomings. First there is the problem of information asymmetry which arises when 
management possesses more information about the firm than the firm’s stakeholders. 
According to Healy and Palepu (2001:407) information asymmetry causes a mis-
valuation of firms’ securities at the stock market, which is one of the signs of an 
inefficient capital market. 
 
Secondly, the existence of information asymmetry leads to the agency problem, which is 
the expropriation of the stakeholders’ interest in the entity by management by virtue of 
being in control of the entity’s resources and in possession of superior information about 
the entity than does the stakeholders (El-Gazzar, Fornaro & Jacob, 2006; Schroeder, 
Clark &Cathey, 2001:49). To perpetuate this expropriation, management may 
misrepresent information about the entity’s performance and governance. For example, 
management may overstate earnings in order to pay themselves bonuses or they may just 
pay themselves attractive packages without disclosing it. 
 
Thirdly, corporate annual reports do not capture events and items that are caused by 
changes in the economic environment such as rapid technological innovation, 
globalisation and the emergence ofnetwork organisations (Healy &Palepu, 2001: 432), all 
of which exposes the interests of stakeholders in the entity to risk (Graham, Harvey, 
&Rajgopal,2005). 
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Rapid technological innovations in information technology, biotechnology, 
telecommunications and the internet are creating financial reporting challenges, which 
have not yet been accommodated by the existing model of financial reporting 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007:4-5). For example intangible assets such as human 
capital and market share, which are critical to the survival of firms, are not reported under 
existing accounting standards. According to Drozd (2004:2) there is a dearth of publicly 
available information on the factors that drive the future value of a business. 
 
Furthermore, the emerging shift from predominantly manufacturing economies to 
knowledge-based economies as evidenced by high-tech companies such as Microsoft, 
which have no tangible non-current assets on their statements of financial position, means 
that investors and lenders are financing ideas rather than assets (Fredrick, 2000:2). This 
development is regarded as one of the modern financial reporting challenges. The 
financial reporting challenge is what type of information to provide to financiers and 
other users of accounting information in order to enable them to make informed decisions 
(Fredrick, 2000:3). 
 
Further to this, the globalisation of capital markets, due to market deregulation and the 
use of the internet and the globalisation of financial reporting standards, have also created 
financial reporting challenges of their own (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007:4-5; 
Healy&Palepu, 2001). In addition, complex organisational structures, which are 
emerging due to innovations such as closely coordinated supply chains and strategic 
alliances, cause difficulties to financial reporters in applying the entity measurement 
concept. Reflecting such types of interdependences in financial statements is a challenge 
to both standard setters and financial reporters. 
 
Lastly, there is the problem of how much to disclose. While stakeholders prefer full 
disclosure by entities, this is often not advisable for both parties because firstly, full 
disclosure may lead to information overload which, according to Parades (2003), leads to 
poor decisions by the users. Ideally, entities are thus required to provide balanced 
information. Secondly, the cost of full disclosure may outweigh the benefits (Belkaoui, 
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2004:187). The costs of full disclosure are information processing costs and proprietary 
costs. Proprietary costs include the loss emanating from disclosing information to 
competitors and legal costs for disclosing private information (Verrecchia, 2001:97-180; 
Dye, 2001:181-235; Ho&Wong, 2001:139-156). Entities thus tend to disclose economic 
information on a cost-benefit basis (Grandal, 1969:457-466). 
 
Due to entities’ failure to disclose fully as expected by their stakeholders, corporate 
disclosure is subject to regulations, and the debate on regulation continues (Fredrick, 
2000:8). The regulation of financial reporting and disclosure involves imposition of laws, 
rules, standards, codes and guidelines of what should be disclosed, when it should be 
disclosed and how it should be disclosed. It also includes provision of the enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure that reporters abide by the regulations. Disclosure, according to 
regulation, is called mandatory disclosure or financial reporting; this is the disclosure that 
ensures that entities disclose some minimum information to stakeholders. Although the 
regulation of corporate disclosure does not completely solve the disclosure problems 
stated above, it is by large an effective way to protect users of corporate annual reports 
from the risks emanating from poor disclosure (Davey, 2008). 
 
1.2 THE RESEARCH TOPIC 
 
Corporate disclosure is regarded as an effective way by which companies communicate 
their affairs to their stakeholders who include investors, lenders, employees, government 
and the public as well as suppliers and customers. Effective corporate disclosure benefits 
not only the company and its stakeholders but also the economy as a whole. However, 
because corporate disclosure has its costs, there is a tendency among firms not to disclose 
their affairs fully but only to disclose after considering the costs and benefits 
involved(Cormier, Aerts, Ledoux &Magnan, 2009:2).This tendency has made corporate 
disclosure a recurrent theme amongst regulators, the academia as well as politicians. 
 
The research topic for this study is ‘Comparative corporate disclosure’ involving 
companies listed on the stock exchanges of Botswana and South Africa. The two 
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countries have contrasting features. While Botswana is a small but developing economy 
with sound economic management, South Africa is a much more advanced economy than 
Botswana in many aspects. Which country has the better quality of corporate disclosure 
given their contrasting features? And what lessons can each country learn from the other? 
 
The IMF/World Bank (2006:20) observed a number of corporate reporting challenges in 
Botswana including fragmented legal provisions regulating corporate reporting, lack of a 
financial reporting enforcement mechanism, poor accounting education and training 
system and lack of an auditing oversight body. The IMF/World Bank (2006:20) also 
revealed that, in spite of these challenges, the quality of corporate disclosure in Botswana 
was improving between2001 and2006. 
 
However, the study did not show what the level of corporate disclosure was and how it 
compared to those of other countries such as South Africa. Although the methodology 
used in the IMF/World Bank (2006) study is not robust, the study nevertheless raises a 
number of issues, one of which forms the basis of this study. 
 
The issues raised include: What is the quality of corporate disclosure? How does it 
compare to that of other countries? What factors influence the present quality of 
corporate disclosure in Botswana and how can it be improved? The choice of 
comparative corporate disclosure as a study topic is thus an attempt to bridge this 
knowledge gap in the literature on corporate disclosure in Botswana. 
 
1.3 THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The improvement in corporate reporting practices that is indicated in the IMF/World 
Bank (2006) report is based on perceptions of the stakeholders rather than on an actual 
analysis of corporate annual reports. Furthermore, the report used the previous quality of 
disclosure as a standard for assessing the improvement in disclosure rather than 
benchmark the quality of disclosure of Botswana companies against that of companies in 
another country. 
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The fundamental questions emanating from the above report are: What is the actual 
(rather than the perceived) quality of corporate disclosure in Botswana and how does it 
compare with that of the best country in the region, South Africa? Three key research 
questions are used in this study, namely: 
(1) What was the quality of corporate disclosure of the companies listed on the BSE and 
of the top 40 listed on the JSE during the two calendar years ended 31 December 
2010 and 2011? 
(2) How does the quality of disclosure of the BSE companies compare with that of the 
top 40 JSE companies over the same period? 
(3) What lessons can be learned? 
 
1.4 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
 
The primary objectives of the study is to benchmark the quality of corporate disclosure of 
the BSE companies against that of the JSE companies and then determine if there is a 
difference in the quality of corporate disclosure between the two sets of companies. The 
study thus involves (i) assessing the quality of corporate disclosure of companies listed 
on the Domestic Equity Board of the BSE and on the JSE and then (ii) determining how 
the quality of corporate disclosure of BSE companies compares with that of the top 40 
JSE companies. The comparison of the quality of corporate disclosure covers different 
sectors as well as key areas of disclosure. 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The study contributes to the ever growing literature on corporate disclosure. In particular, 
the study sheds light on the comparative quality of corporate disclosure in Botswana and 
South Africa. The study benchmarks the quality of corporate disclosure of a group of 
companies from an emerging market against that of a group of companies from a 
developed stock market, thereby offering an opportunity for the group with a lower 
quality of disclosure to learn from the other. Since no previous comparative corporate 
disclosure study of this nature has been undertaken, this study has useful insights to 
policymakers in Botswana and South Africa. For example, regulatory bodies in Botswana 
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are likely to use the findings of this study to improve the quality of corporate disclosure 
in that country. 
 
Furthermore, this study encourages further research on cross-country corporate 
disclosure. Public knowledge of the comparative quality of corporate disclosure in the 
two countries is likely to complement their respective governments’ efforts in promoting 
foreign direct investments and financial crises. Furthermore, the regulatory bodies and 
the academia are likely to pick up from the findings of this study some problem areas of 
their interest to address. 
 
1.6 THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
This study covers all 23 companies listed on the Domestic Equity Board of the BSE and 
the top 40 companies listed on the JSE during the years ended 31 December 2010 and 
2011; and the selection of the top JSE companies was based on the Global Classification 
System. The research approach entails a literature study that is carried out to identify the 
knowledge gap in previous studies, to obtain background information to the research 
topic, to identify tested methods, techniques and research designs for uncovering the 
answer to the research questions, as well as to obtain an understanding of the conceptual 
and regulatory principles that have a bearing on the study. 
 
Literature study involves library research which in turn includes reading previous 
research publications, journal articles and textbooks. It also involves carrying out 
research on the internet and studying existing regulatory instruments in the two countries. 
The bulk of the material from the literature study is presented  under Mandatory 
corporate disclosure, Contextual corporate disclosure, Integrated reporting and Research 
methodology. 
 
This literature study is complemented with the use of content analysis techniques and is 
applied on the corporate annual reports of a population of 23 companies that are listed on 
the Domestic Equity Board of the BSE and the top 40 companies from the JSE, to 
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examine the nature and quality of information disclosed by the companies listed on the 
two stock markets.  
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005:142) content analysis involves identifying the 
documents to analyse a particular body of material for the purpose of establishing 
patterns, themes or biases. In this study, content analysis involves studying the 
companies’ corporate annual reports for the calendar years 2010 and 2011 and to use the 
information disclosed in the corporate annual reports to answer the questions raised in the 
research instrument. 
 
The literature study and the content analysis are complementary to each other in the sense 
that the literature study involves examining a selected content of material while the 
content analysis involves examining a selected type of literature. The use of content 
analysis is justified in this study because of the nature of the source of data used. 
Whenever data is to be collected from some form of text such as the corporate annual 
reports, content analysis is regarded as the most appropriate method to use (Babbie, 
2007:320; Mouton, 2001:166). 
 
1.7 PILOT STUDY 
 
A pilot study involving four companies listed on the BSE was carried out using the study 
approaches and methods outlined above. The study involved collecting data from the four 
companies and processing it using the Excel spreadsheet software in line with the 
methods stated in this chapter. During the piloting process the checklist was found too 
complex to apply, so it was modified. The modified version appears in Appendix A of 
this study and the findings of this study are based on the revised corporate disclosure 
checklist. 
 
1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
There are four limitations in this study: First, the study covers a two-year period only. 
Therefore, the results obtained may not reflect a true trend in the quality of corporate 
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disclosure. Secondly, content analysis cannot be one hundred per cent objective; 
therefore, the findings of this study might be influenced by the degree of objectivity of 
the content analyst. Thirdly, the study excludes private and close companies and therefore 
does not reflect a complete state of each country’s quality of corporate disclosure. Lastly, 
a complete comparative study involving Botswana and South Africa is not possible 
because integrated reporting is not yet  practised in Botswana during the period covered 
by this study. 
 
1.9 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is organised into seven chapters which are laid out as follows: 
 
Chapter one: Introduction. 
The introductory chapter discusses the research topic and gives the background to the 
study. Furthermore, it presents the problem statement, the objective of the study and the 
significance of the study. The chapter also outlines the research approaches used, the 
outcome of the pilot study and the limitations of the study. At the end, an outline of the 
organisation of the study is provided.  
 
Chapter two: Mandatory corporate disclosure 
This chapter defines mandatory corporate disclosure as disclosure according to Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) and gives a brief history of mandatory 
disclosure in terms of the phases through which mandatory disclosure evolved to its 
present form. Then the chapter examines various theories that underlie mandatory 
disclosure. The theories examined include the IASB Conceptual Framework, Positive 
Accounting Theory, Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and the Agency Theory. 
The need for a comprehensive theory is also stated. Furthermore, the chapter compares 
and contrasts the quality of the corporate financial reporting environments of Botswana 
and South Africa, and underscores the need to carry out this study in order to determine 
the actual quality of disclosure in the two countries. At the end of the chapter a summary 
is provided. 
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Chapter three: Contextual corporate disclosure 
Chapter three defines contextual disclosure and outlines its evolution from voluntary 
disclosure to sustainability reporting and the role players involved. It also examines the 
main theories and frameworks underlying contextual disclosure. The theories examined 
include Agency Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Legitimacy Theory. The frameworks 
examined are the Enhanced Business Reporting Framework, the IFRS Practice Statement 
Management commentary and the GRI Reporting Framework. In addition a brief review 
of contextual literature in Botswana and South Africa is presented and then, at the end of 
the chapter, a summary is provided. 
 
Chapter four: Integrated reporting  
The chapter gives a background to integrated reporting in terms of the shortcomings of 
traditional corporate reporting. This is followed by an examination of the concept 
‘integrated reporting’; and the reasons why integrated reporting is advocated in terms of 
the benefits of integrated reporting. Further to this, the role players of integrated reporting 
are identified and acknowledged, as well as the practical and theoretical issues in 
implementing integrated reporting and the way forward. The chapter also looks at the 
global trends of integrated reporting as well as the state of Integrated Reporting in 
Botswana and South Africa. 
 
Chapter five: Research methodology 
This chapter describes the research instrument used in the study, the corporate disclosure 
checklist as a list of specially set questions the responses to which indicate whether a 
particular piece of information has been disclosed or not. The areas from which questions 
have been set are also stated as mandatory disclosure, corporate governance, 
sustainability reporting and integrated reporting. 
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Furthermore, the chapter describes the population from which the samples studied were 
selected and how the samples were selected. In addition, the data collection process in 
terms of the steps involved and how the disclosure checklist scores the quality of 
corporate disclosure are explained. The issue of instrument reliability and validity is 
discussed and some of its limitations are acknowledged as well. 
 
Lastly the chapter discusses how the data has been processed using the spreadsheet 
program and how it was analysed in terms of graphs and tables. At the end of the chapter 
a summary and conclusions are provided. 
 
Chapter six: Research findings 
The findings of the study are presented and analysed in this chapter. First, charts 
depicting the quality of corporate disclosure for each area of corporate disclosure are 
presented followed by a tabular presentation of the quality of corporate disclosure for the 
sectors in which the companies studied fall. Second, the quality of corporate disclosure 
depicted by charts and tables is discussed. Themain areas for which the quality of 
corporate disclosure is assessed include: overall disclosure, mandatory disclosure, and 
contextual disclosure. Furthermore, disclosure of the major categories of corporate 
information, and disclosure of individual pieces of corporate information and 
comparative disclosure is also assessed. At the end of the chapter a summary of the 
research findings is given. 
 
Chapter seven: Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
This chapter summarises previous chapters and draws conclusions from the research 
findings. The chapter also makes recommendations and suggestions for further research. 
 
1.10 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
 
This study uses some terminology contextually. Given below are the definitions of some of the 
terms used: 
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• Disclosure: The presentation of financial information either on the face of the financial 
statements or in the notes thereto or anywhere in the corporate annual report. Financial 
reporting and disclosure are used interchangeably. 
• Quality of disclosure: An indicator of how low or high the level of the information 
disclosed in corporate annual reports is. 
• Low quality disclosure: The quality of disclosure is said to be low if information is not 
disclosed at all or if disclosed, the disclosure does not comply with applicable standards, 
codes or rules. 
• High quality of disclosure: The quality of disclosure is said to be high if the item(s) in 
question has been fully disclosed or in the case of contextual disclosure an explanation 
for non-disclosure is given. 
• Firm: A firm is a listed company for the purpose of this study 
• Contextual disclosure: The disclosure in excess of the disclosure prescribed by the 
GAAP. It is disclosure of information that complements the disclosure prescribed by the 
GAAP. 
• An exchange is a stock market or a securities exchange market. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
MANDATORY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study as stated in chapter one is to describe the comparative level of 
corporate disclosure of companies listed on the JSE and on the BSE. Although the 
literature on mandatory corporate disclosure in general abounds, there is nevertheless 
scanty literature on the level of cross-country mandatory corporate disclosure, 
particularly the comparative level of mandatory corporate disclosure of South Africa and 
Botswana listed companies. 
 
Mandatory corporate disclosure is described in this study as a disclosure in accordance 
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Mandatory corporate disclosure can be defined as those 
aspects and items of information that are required by statutes, stock exchanges or 
prescribed by accounting standards (Cronje, 2008; Myburg, 2001:201; Owusu-Ansah, 
1998). 
 
This chapter presents a review of the literature on mandatory corporate disclosure in 
general. The review covers the history of financial reporting, the theoretical framework of 
corporate disclosure and the financial reporting environments of Botswana and South 
Africa. The review is presented in four subsections namely, a brief history of mandatory 
corporate disclosure, the theoretical framework of mandatory corporate disclosure and 
the financial reporting environments of Botswana and South Africa. 
 
2.2 BRIEF HISTORY OF MANDATORY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
 
Modern financial reporting started as unregulated primitive accounting records about 
5000 BC in the form of knots on cords, marks on stone and clay tables as well as marks 
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on papyrus and papers used for keeping tallies of what was owed or owned by 
unsophisticated traders, governments, temples and estate owners of the ancient 
civilisations of Mesopotamia, Italy and Egypt (Edwards, 1996; Gouws &Cronje, 2008:7; 
Mathew &Perera, 1996:9). 
 
As documented by Mathew and Perera (1996) primitive accounting was more concerned 
with stewardship than with the communication of information for decision making 
purposes. Furthermore, because of the weaknesses of primitive accounting, the ancient 
merchants of Italy soon became dissatisfied with the system and adopted the Double 
Entry System instead(Brown, 2003:109; Edwards, 1996:46). 
 
The Double Entry system of accounting involves recording two aspects of a transaction, a 
debit and a credit; as such it was more efficient than the primitive system. Edwards 
(1996:46) and Brown (2003:109) note that Luca Pacioli, who is regarded as the father of 
the Double Entry system, was actually its publisher rather than its inventor, for the 
system is said to have originated from the Far East. 
 
However, the Double Entry system is not a system of corporate disclosure, but rather a 
way of recording the dual aspects of a transaction. Its importance lies in its ability to 
produce verifiable transactions. Thus, the Double Entry system is nothing different from 
the plus and minus signs that are used to record transactions using spreadsheet software 
such as Excel. It is thus strange how the Double Entry system has survived the test of 
time and technology. According to Belkaoui (2001:1-5), the Double Entry System was 
followed by the development of accounting principles in the USA which characterise 
modern accounting practices. 
 
The emergence of thecorporate form of business organisations which were managed by 
non-owner managers created the demand for corporate financial information. The 
managers of corporate entities had to report regularly to their owners through financial 
statements to keep them informed about the performance of their business (Lewis & 
Pendril, 1998:20). The system of financial corporate reporting led, in turn, initially to the 
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development of the accounting profession and, subsequently, to the emergence of 
regulated corporate reporting. To date regulated corporate financial reporting has 
developed to become the most important form of corporate reporting (Healy &Palepu, 
2001). 
 
However, modern regulated corporate financial reporting has several shortcomings 
including, providing information that is not forward-looking, not providing non-financial 
information, overemphasis on short-term results, failure to capture the drivers of firms’ 
value, and preoccupation with the quality of output from the accounting system rather 
than with the inputs and processes that generate the output. These weaknesses have led to 
calls for a new corporate reporting model (IRC, 2011:1; Litan&Wallison, 2000) and the 
emergence of integrated financial reporting. In spite of its shortcomings, regulated 
corporate financial reporting remains the main source of the bulk of information about 
corporate entities. This is the reason why this study made use of information from 
regulated corporate reports to assess the comparative level of corporate disclosure of 
listed companies in Botswana and South Africa. 
 
2.3 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING 
 
The  Framework of Financial Reporting has evolved along two approaches: the ‘explain–
predict’ approach and the ‘evaluate–develop’ approach (Coetzee, 2010:2; Inanga& 
Schroeder, 2005:231). The ‘explain–predict’ approach on one hand, comprises several 
theories, including Agency Theory, Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory, and Positive 
Accounting Theory; all of which attempt to explain and predict accounting practice. The 
‘evaluate–develop’ approach on the other hand, is a prescriptive theory, the IASB 
Framework, which prescribes a set of principles that are used to evaluate existing 
accounting practices as well as guide the development of new accounting rules (Coetsee, 
2010:2). Although both approaches influence accounting practice the ‘evaluate–develop’ 
approach seems to be predominant. A brief explanation of each theory follows next. 
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2.3.1 The IASB Conceptual Framework 
 
The IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (Conceptual Framework) is a 
set of broad principles, definitions, assumptions and concepts that (a) provide a general 
frame of reference for evaluating accounting practices and (b) guide the development of 
new accounting practices. The primary focus of the Conceptual Framework is thus not to 
explain or predict accounting practice, but rather to guide the evaluation of existing 
practices and facilitate the development of new ones (Hendriksen, 1982:1; Wolk, Dodd 
&Rozycki, 2008:5). 
 
Hendriksen (1982:1) considers the provision of a coherent set of principles for evaluating 
accounting practice and developing new accounting practice as the most important goal 
of accounting theory. This is why the Conceptual Frameworkis committed to setting 
accounting standards which are principle-based rather than rule-based. However, there is 
no empirical evidence in support of the Conceptual Framework supremacy over other 
theories of accounting. The general view is that there is no comprehensive theory of 
accounting (Belkaoui, 2004; Coetsee, 2010:2; Watts &Zimmerman, 1979:301). 
 
There are several reasons why the Conceptual Framework is not a generally accepted 
theory of accounting. Firstly, the Conceptual Framework describes accounting practices 
instead of explaining and predicting them. Secondly is its failure to take into account 
non-financial information; and thirdly is its insistence on the historical cost basis of 
measurement. The other reasons as documented by Benson, Carmichael,Jamal, Demiski, 
Laux, Rajgopal, Vrana & Dharan, 2006; citing the American Accounting Association’s 
Financial Accounting Committee are that it contains general statements that are refutable; 
lacks unity of purpose and fails to define boundaries within which standards setters 
should operate. TheIFRS Foundation, (2013), also reveals many gaps in the Conceptual 
Framework which need to be addressed. 
 
Furthermore, Nobes (2005:25) documents that most accounting standards that are based 
on the Conceptual Framework are inconsistent with the Conceptual Framework itself. 
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This is either because clear principles are lacking in the Conceptual Framework or the 
principles used are inappropriate. This state of affairs may adversely affect the quality of 
financial reporting. Consequently, there have been calls for a new financial reporting 
model which ultimately led to the introduction of integrated reporting as a new financial 
reporting model. The question one may pose is; is integrated reporting based on a 
comprehensive theoretical framework with sound principles?  
 
This study evaluates the level of corporate disclosure of Botswana’s and South Africa’s 
listed companies. The theories discussed in this chapter are relevant to this study in the 
sense that they provide the frame of reference for evaluating the comparative level of 
corporate disclosure. In particular the checklist used in content analysis in chapter 5 is 
based on accounting standards and other regulations that are based on the principles of 
the Conceptual Framework and other theories discussed in this chapter. 
 
2.3.2 Positive Accounting Theory 
 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Positive Accounting Theory seeks to 
explain and predict how choices of accounting standards, methods and information 
disclosure formats are made. The assumptions on which it is based are that: preparers act 
opportunistically in making accounting choices, contracting costs between an entity and 
its stakeholders influence the choice of accounting practices and that there is an explicit 
set of accounting choices to select from. 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986:244-260) highlight the following key hypotheses of 
Positive Accounting Theory: 
(i) The bonus plan hypothesis: ceteris paribus, managers of entities with bonus plans are 
more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future 
periods to the current period. 
(ii) The debt/equity hypothesis: ceteris paribus, the larger the debt/equity ratio the more 
likely the entity’s manager is to select accounting procedures that shift earnings from 
future periods to the current period. 
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(iii) The size hypothesis: ceteris paribus, the larger the entity the more likely  managers 
are to choose accounting procedures that defer reported earnings from the current to 
future periods. 
 
So far evidence from tests of the theory’s hypotheses is consistent with the hypotheses, 
implying that the theory does explain and predict the choice of accounting practices. An 
entity’s social disclosure for example, has been found to be explained by the Positive 
Accounting political cost (size) hypothesis (Belkaoui &Karpik 1989; Ness &Mirza, 1991; 
Panchapakesan & McKinnon, 1992). Furthermore, Lourenco and Curto (2010:739) 
observed that the type of jointly controlled entity influences the choice of accounting 
methods to report joint ventures. 
 
However, Sternberg (1997:9) argues that the theory has several shortcomings. In the first 
place it does not clarify whether the incentives for making accounting choices are 
economic, or efficient or social in nature. Secondly, the theory does not explain all 
accounting practices, as much remain unexplained. Thirdly, the implication in the theory 
that accounting choices are influenced by transactional costs only is not correct as there 
are other factors that influence the accounting choices made. For example, the nature of 
the entity, professional requirements and industry practice may influence the choice of 
accounting practices (Gouws &Cronje, 2008; Belkaoui, 2004:57). Lastly, the theory just 
focuses on the supply side of disclosure; the decision-making usefulness of the 
information disclosed does not feature as a factor influencing the choice. However, these 
shortcomings do not render the theory completely invalid. 
 
2.3.3 Legitimacy Theory 
 
The Legitimacy Theory seeks to explain an attempt by corporate entities to fight 
perceived threats to their legitimacy. The theory is based on the premise that there is an 
implied social contract between a corporate entity and society, and that the terms of the 
social contract specify the societal expectations from the corporate entity while at the 
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same time defining the entity’s operations, its growth and survival (Guthrie & Parker, 
1989). 
 
The theory then suggests that a legitimacy gap arises when an entity is perceived to be 
failing to meet the societal expectations and that if the legitimacy gap is not narrowed 
then the entity begins to lose its legitimacy (Sethi, 1979). The evidence of loss of 
legitimacy may take different forms including revocation of the social contract and 
various sanctions including curtailment of access to some resources and even reduced 
demand for the entity’s products. In extreme cases the very existence of the entity may be 
threatened (Tilling, 2008:5). 
 
Three strategies to narrow the legitimacy gap have been identified, namely the legitimacy 
establishing strategy, the reactive strategy and legitimacy maintaining strategy (Khor, 
2003). The strategy adopted by an entity depends on its circumstances (Dowling 
&Pfeffer, 1975:127; Khor, 2003: 6-7). New entities on one hand tend to adopt a 
legitimacy establishing strategy by complying with the terms of the social contract and 
disclosing the fact (Hearit, 1995:2). 
 
On the other hand, entities operating in a relatively stable environment tend to adopt a 
legitimacy maintaining strategy (Ashford &Gibbs, 1990:53), while entities that are 
threatened by sanctions or closure tend to adopt a legitimacy defence strategy. Regarding 
the defensive strategy, two options have been identified, either the entity may change its 
behaviour to comply with the new terms of the social contract or it can change the 
perception of society towards the entity’s behaviour (Ashford & Gibbs, 1990:83; Tilling, 
2008:10). 
 
In contrast to the Conceptual Framework, the Legitimacy Theory explains and predicts 
corporate disclosure from a preparer’s perspective, as a tool by which entities 
communicate their legitimising strategies. The Legitimacy Theory holds that an entity’s 
disclosure policies are influenced by its legitimising strategy. Accordingly, given an 
entity’s legitimising strategy, one can deduce the type of corporate disclosure that 
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achieves the strategy. This implies that disclosure levels between entities that face 
legitimacy crises could, other things being equal, be due to the differences in their 
legitimising strategies. 
 
The validity of the Legitimacy Theory has been confirmed by studies of entity survival 
strategy during times of threat. It has been observed that whenever regulations, laws, 
standards or taste change, the entities that survive are those which adjust their behaviour 
to match the new situation (Ashford &Gibbs, 1990:183). Entities that fail to narrow their 
legitimacy gaps succumb to sanctions and some fail to survive. However, although 
legitimacy theory is generally believed to explain corporate social disclosure and 
maintain that Legitimacy Theory can be rebutted or demonstrated depending on the 
association between disclosure and patterns and changes in societal opinions. 
 
The Legitimacy Theory is said to be one of the most cited theories in financial reporting 
and disclosure (Tilling, 2008:1). The areas in which the theory is applicable include; the 
Accounting Framework, social and environment accounting, sustainability reporting and 
the reporting of contingencies. For example, the theory validates the Accounting 
Framework by showing that stakeholders do influence financial disclosure. Concerning 
social and environmental disclosure, De Villiers and Van Staden, (2006:763) observed 
that legitimate objectives may be saved by changing the volume of environmental 
disclosure. Further to this, Brookhart, Beeler, and Culpepper (2005), observed that the 
issue of Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 92 in the USA led to an increase in 
environmental disclosure in the Chemical and Petroleum industry; which is a reactive 
legitimacy strategy in terms of the Legitimacy Theory. 
 
The Legitimacy Theory thus provides a sound theoretical framework for understanding 
how and why management adopts certain disclosure policies. However, Gray (2002) 
cited by Khor (2003:14) contends that the theory may be considered underdeveloped 
because of many gaps in the academic literature which embrace the fundamental themes 
of legitimacy. 
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2.3.4 Stakeholder Theory 
 
A stake is an interest in something. A stakeholder is thus someone with an interest in 
something. Woodward (1993) identifies business stakeholders as comprising interest 
groups including human resources, owners, and non-equity suppliers of funds, suppliers 
of goods and services, customers, political groups, the general public as well as the 
physical environment. However, the concept ‘stakeholder’ has two meanings; the original 
but narrow concept of stakeholder and the widely used concept of stakeholder. 
 
According to the original meaning, stakeholders are those groups without whose support 
the entity would cease to exist (Freeman, 1994:25). This original but narrow meaning of 
the theory is practical because, to the extent that an entity depends on capital contributed 
by shareholders, the shareholders are the entity’s stakeholders. Similarly, for an entity 
which depends on its employees’ skills for survival, (a knowledge management entity) or 
an entity which depends on suppliers or customers for its survival, the employees, 
suppliers and customers are its stakeholders. 
 
In contrast, the widely used stakeholder concept views a stakeholder as any group or 
individual who can affect or be affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
objectives. This definition of stakeholder is so inclusive that every creature, human or 
otherwise, becomes a stakeholder including unborn children and terrorists (Freeman, 
1984; Sternberg, 1997:4).Both concepts however, are the basis of the Stakeholder 
Theory. 
 
Central to the Stakeholder Theory is the doctrine that business should be run not for the 
financial benefits of their owners but for the benefit of all their stakeholders. The 
essential tenets of the Stakeholder Theory are therefore that organisations are accountable 
to their stakeholders and that the proper objective of management is to balance the 
stakeholders’ conflicting interests. According to Camara, Chamorro and Moreno 
(2009:697) the Stakeholder Theory explains organisational responses to changing 
demands from constituents. 
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However, the theory suffers from two major weaknesses; firstly the inclusive definition 
of the term ‘stakeholder’ is not practical because an organisation cannot be accountable 
to an endless list of stakeholders. Secondly the statement that the role of management is 
to balance the conflicting interests of various stakeholders is not attainable in business, 
given the countless business stakeholders and their conflicting interests (Sternberg, 
1997).  
 
Its shortcoming notwithstanding, the Stakeholder Theory’s basic tenets have some 
applications in corporate reporting and disclosure. For example, its tenet of accountability 
to stakeholders means much more than providing them with information that is useful for 
decision-making. As Van der Laan (2009:15) observed companies are increasingly 
reporting on their interactions with society through environmental reports, corporate 
governance reports and social responsibility reports. This type of reporting provides 
evidence of how the Stakeholder Theory explains corporate disclosure (Van der Laan, 
2009; 15). 
 
Furthermore, according to Gray, Owen and Adam (1996) management may use corporate 
disclosure as a tool for managing the information needs of powerful stakeholders and 
thus be able to manipulate the most powerful stakeholders in order to gain their support, 
which they require for their survival. The Stakeholder Theory is thus a very powerful 
means of explaining, justifying and understanding financial reporting and disclosure. 
 
2.3.5 Agency Theory 
 
According to this theory, when one party (the principal) delegates decision making 
powers to another party (the agent) under a contract, a principal – agent relationship 
arises (Jensen &Meckling, 1976; Clarke, 2004:78). Jensen and Meckling cited in (Clarke, 
2004:59) define the principal-agent relationship as a contract under which one or more 
persons (principals) engages another person (the agent) to perform some services on their 
behalf, which involves giving some decision making authority to the agent. 
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While the intention of both parties in the agency relationship is to work towards the 
interest of the principal, information asymmetry and greed lure management into 
pursuing personal objectives instead of those of the principal. This conflict of interest or 
lack of goal congruence between management and the shareholders is described as the 
agency problem (Fama &Jensen, 1983; Clarke, 2004:65; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
A typical example of the principal–agent relationship is that between management and 
shareholders (Jensen &Meckling, 1976; Clarke, 2004:61). The relationship arises when 
shareholders delegate the administration of an entity to management, thus making 
management the agent of the shareholders. In this kind of relationship, the expectation is 
that the agent (management) will pursue the shareholders’ wealth maximisation 
objective.  
 
In the shareholder – management relationship the agency problem may take different 
forms, for example, management may pay themselves hefty remuneration packages, 
undertake risky investment projects or, because of information asymmetry and greed, 
management may pursue personal objectives instead of those of the principal, or they 
may operate less profitably (Gitman, 2009:19). 
 
Another example of the principal – agent relationship is that between shareholders 
(through management) and lenders. Lenders entrust their money to shareholders, with the 
expectation that shareholders will honour the loan covenants agreed between the two 
parties. However, what may happen is that the shareholders, through management, may 
pay themselves excessive dividends or take on more loans contrary to the existing 
covenants with the lenders (Gitman, 2009:570). 
 
The Agency Theory’s concern to solving the agency problem has led to two somehow 
different but complementary versions of the theory; the Positivist version and the 
principal – agent version (Eisenhardt, 1989; Clarke, 2004:80). According to the Positivist 
version of the Agency Theory, the agency problem can be solved by prescribing the 
appropriate governance mechanisms to limit the agent’s opportunistic behaviour. Jensen 
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(1983) and Clarke (2004:80) document that the proponents of the Positivist Theory are 
more concerned with describing the mechanisms that solve the agency problem than with 
the various forms that the agency relationship may take or the optimal governance 
mechanism to apply. 
 
Positivists propose two alternative approaches in solving the agency problem depending 
on the extent to which the principal is able to observe the behaviour of the agent. When 
the behaviour of the agent is not observable this version of the Agency Theory 
recommends an outcome type of contract (Eisenhardt, 1989; Clarke, 2004:80). This is a 
contract in which the principal remunerates the agent on the basis of outcome. Eisenhardt 
(1989) argues that such a contract will automatically realign the agent’s goals to those of 
the principal. Remuneration in the form of share options is an example of this type of 
outcome-based contract. Alternatively, the principal can invest in information systems 
such as budgeting, and corporate disclosure that motivate the agent to align his goals with 
those of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Clarke, 2004:80). 
 
The principal – agent version of the Agency Theory, on the other hand, is concerned with 
the general theory of agent-principal relationships as well as with the best approach to 
solving the agency problem (Harris &Raviv, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989). It is general in that 
it can be applied in different forms of the principal – agent relationships including the 
customer – supplier, bank – customer and employee – employer relationships, and not 
just with the owner – management relationship as with the Positivist version (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Clarke, 2004:80-81). Its approach to the agency problem involves determining the 
optimal contract between the principal and the agent depending on the extent to which the 
behaviour of the agent is observable (Clarke, 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Thus, when the behaviour of the agent is unobservable the principal – agent version of 
the Agency Theory proposes that the principal should either use an outcome based 
contract or invest in information systems such as budgeting and disclosure that assist the 
principal in knowing what the agent is doing. On the other hand, where the principal does 
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know what the agent is doing, the principal should use a behaviour-based contract to 
mitigate the agency problem (Clarke, 2004:81). 
 
The two versions of the Agency Theory are complimentary in that they both prescribe 
investment in information systems as one of the solutions to the agency problem. From a 
financial reporting and accounting perspective, the Agency Theory explains and predicts 
accounting practice by citing the use of accounting practices to reduce information 
asymmetry, promote transparency and fight agency problems. Typical accounting rules 
and regulations that explain how the Agency Theory influences mandatory corporate 
disclosure include the disclosure of related party transactions, directors’ remuneration 
and auditors’ remuneration. 
 
2.3.6 The need for a comprehensive theory 
 
Lack of a generally accepted theory of financial reporting remains a major concern. A 
comprehensive accounting theory could be developed by consolidating the theories from 
the two schools of thought into one theory. The new theory would not only guide the 
evaluation of accounting practice and development of new accounting practices but 
would also explain and predict accounting practices. Such a theory would however not 
overcome all the weaknesses of the current model. For example, non-financial 
information would still not feature in it; nevertheless it would deliver higher quality 
financial information than the conventional financial reporting model (ICAEW, 2009:30). 
 
A consolidated theory would merge all the principles from the ‘explain–predict’ school of 
theories with the decision usefulness principles from the ConceptualFramework. Issues 
such as organisational legitimacy, agency costs, cost and benefits of the accounting rule 
used would feature in the consolidated theory. Since there is evidence that the explain–
predict theories also explain financial reporting, a consolidated framework of financial 
reporting, incorporating all the principles from these theories, would meet the needs of 
users in a much better way than is currently the case. 
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2.4 THE FINANCIAL REPORTING ENVIRONMENT OF BOTSWANA AND 
SOUTHAFRICA 
 
Cross-country disclosure literature is growing. Increased interest in such studies seems to 
be due to new evidence that cross country differences in corporate disclosure are 
associated with inter alia, differences in economic growth, efficient allocation of 
investments and development of financial intermediaries (Bushman & Smith, 2003:66). 
At the same time Khanna, Palepu and Srinivasan, (2004) contend that cross-border 
economic interactions are associated with similarities in disclosure and governance 
practices. 
 
These views suggest that benchmarking one country’s corporate disclosure can provide 
important insights regarding the country’s differences in economic performance. Given 
the significant volume of cross-border economic transactions and the applicability of 
IFRS in both countries, one would expect asKhanna, Palepu and Srinivasan (2004) 
documented similarities in disclosure and governance practices between Botswana and 
South Africa. 
 
However, the country’s quality of corporate disclosure is also influenced by the quality of 
its financial environment, comprising other macro-level factors including an accounting 
professional body, securities exchange, financial reporting regulatory body, corporate 
laws, Conceptual Frameworkaccounting standards, an independent auditing oversight 
body as well as existence of education and training providers. Culture and effectiveness 
of the judiciary system are also determinants of the quality of a country’s quality of 
financial reporting environment. Given that the samples studied are from countries using 
similar accounting rules, any difference in the levels of corporate disclosure between the 
two samples may provoke further research into the possible causes of the difference. 
 
Botswana’s financial reporting environment is characterised by a Stock Exchange, Stock 
Exchange rules, a Financial Reporting Regulatory Authority, the Companies Act, the 
Conceptual Framework’s IFRS, Botswana Institute of Chartered Accountants and the 
new Accountants Act. The IMF/World Bank (2006) Report on the Observance of 
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accounting and auditing Standards and Codes (ROSC) documents that, while Botswana‘s 
efforts in aligning its financial reporting practices with internationally accepted standards 
and codes was considerable, there was still room for improvement. 
 
Furthermore, the report notes that although corporate disclosure practices improved 
during the five year period ending May 2006, several improvements were still required 
including; the technical capacity of the regulatory bodies, giving legal mandate to 
corporate entities to follow IFRS’s in the preparation of financial statements, creation of 
an independent oversight body for the audit profession and improving the quality of 
professional education and training. However, the ROSC report (IMF/World Bank, 2006) 
does not indicate the level of corporate disclosure of the Botswana corporate entities or 
the methodology that was employed in the study. It is thus not possible to replicate the 
study or to compare the country’s quality of disclosure with that of other countries. 
 
The South African financial reporting environment is similar to that of Botswana in two 
respects. Firstly, both countries use the IFRS and secondly the King Reports on 
Corporate Governance in South Africa are also used in Botswana. 
 
In contrast however, South Africa has a world-class securities exchange and a high-class 
education system. Furthermore, South Africa has one of the strongest economies in 
Africa. Yet the IMF/World Bank (2003) documents that investors were of the view that 
the information contained in financial statements was not reliable. Further to this the 
same investors thought that a strong regulatory regime and an effective enforcement 
mechanism were required to improve the quality of corporate financial reporting. 
 
Just like the 2006 IMF/World Bank report on Botswana, no indication was given of the 
level of corporate disclosure. Certainly, since the publication of the IMF/World Bank 
Reports, there have been improvements in both countries in line with the 
recommendations of the World Bank. However, the actual level of comparative 
disclosure corporate disclosure remains unknown. Although it is not the primary 
objective of this study to assess the country-level of corporate disclosure, since an 
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assessment of comparative level of corporate disclosure depends inter alia, on the level 
of corporate disclosure in each country, the country-level of corporate disclosure is a 
necessary step of this study. 
 
2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The chapter began by explaining mandatory corporate disclosure as disclosure in 
accordance with GAAP or IFRS. A brief historical development of mandatory corporate 
disclosure followed next, covering; primitive accounting records, the double entry system 
and ultimately regulated financial reporting; which is to date the main source of corporate 
financial information. 
 
The two categories of theories on which modern financial reporting is based are; (a) the 
Conceptual Framework, which prescribes accounting practice and (b) theories that 
explain and predict accounting practice; which include Agency Theory, Positive 
Accounting Theory,  Stakeholder Theory and Legitimacy Theory. The Conceptual 
Framework is regarded as the predominant theory of financial reporting. 
 
The Conceptual Framework is a set of accounting principles that provide a reference 
framework for evaluating accounting practice as well as for developing new accounting 
practices. The Agency Theory on the other hand holds that accounting practices are used 
to fight agency problems and information asymmetry, while the Positive Accounting 
Theory posits that the choice of accounting practices is influenced by cost and benefits 
involved in the transactions they measure. 
 
The Stakeholder Theory posits that accounting practices are selected on the basis of their 
ability to provide accountability to the stakeholders while the Legitimacy Theory argues 
that corporate entities’ choice of accounting practices is influenced by the legitimacy gap 
they wish to narrow in order to protect their legitimacy. Although the Conceptual 
Framework is a predominant theory, the consensus is that there is no generally accepted 
theory of financial reporting, hence the need for a consolidated theory. 
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A brief review of the financial reporting environment in Botswana and South Africa 
reveals that financial reporting in both countries is based on the Conceptual Framework 
accounting standards. The currencies of the two countries are almost at par and the 
volume of cross border trade between the two countries is quite substantial. In contrast, 
South Africa’s economy is the biggest in Africa and its securities exchange is ranked 
among the best in the world. Furthermore, its regulatory bodies and education system are 
more advanced than those of Botswana.  
 
Based on the comparison above, it is ‘strange’ that  the IMF/World Bank reports on 
observance of standards and codes (ROSC) on both countries gave recommendations for 
improving corporate reporting without indicating what the actual level of corporate 
disclosure was. As this study is about the comparative quality of disclosure of South 
African and Botswana listed companies; the history of financial reporting, the underlying 
theories of Financial Reporting and the financial reporting environment of the two 
countries provide an important context within which to carry out the study. 
 
The next chapter examines another type of corporate disclosure known as contextual 
corporate disclosure. The analysis covers inter alia different forms of contextual 
corporate disclosure, the underlying theories and its landscape in Botswana and South 
Africa from where the samples studied are drawn. 
  
30 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
CONTEXTUAL CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Chapter two of this study discussed mandatory corporate disclosure (commonly known as 
financial reporting). It covered a brief history of mandatory corporate disclosure from 
primitive records to modern financial reporting, the theories underlying mandatory 
disclosure, and an overview of the environment of financial reporting in the countries 
where the study will be conducted.  
 
Furthermore, the chapter showed that, despite several hundred years of development, 
financial reporting still suffers from shortcomings which make it fail to deliver some of 
the critical information needed by users. Even though further improvements in financial 
reporting are possible, there is consensus amongst writers that the improvements cannot 
make mandatory disclosures deliver, among others, forward looking and non-financial 
information. At the same time Myburg (2001) cautions that increased mandatory 
disclosure may lead to information overload to users and further processing costs to 
preparers. Contextual disclosure is thus a vital supplement to mandatory disclosure. 
 
This chapter discusses contextual disclosure in terms of its evolution and the theories 
underlying it, and also presents a short review of contextual disclosure literature in 
Botswana and South Africa. The chapter is organised as follows: the first section covers 
the theories and frameworks underlying contextual disclosure, the second section 
discusses the concept contextual disclosure, while the third and the fourth sections 
presents an evolution of contextual disclosure and a brief review of the literature of 
contextual disclosure of Botswana and South Africa respectively. 
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3.2 CONTEXTUAL DISCLOSURE THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS 
 
There are a number of theories and frameworks that underlie contextual disclosure. Some 
of these theories try to explain and predict contextual disclosure while others prescribe 
how contextual disclosure should be made. On the one hand, the Agency Theory, 
Stakeholder Theory and the Legitimacy Theory try to explain and predict contextual 
disclosure. In essence these theories represent an inductive approach. On the other hand, 
the three frameworks namely the Management Commentary, the Enhanced Business 
Reporting Framework and the GRI Framework discussed under 3.4 below, prescribe how 
contextual disclosure should be practiced (a deductive approach). 
 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
 
According to the Agency theory the manager of an entity is the agent of the principal 
(shareholders) but because of inter alia information asymmetry shareholders may not be 
aware timeously of what is happening in the firm; this situation creates an opportunity for 
the manager to behave opportunistically. Corporate disclosure, including contextual 
disclosure, may be used to reduce information asymmetry and thus to control the agent so 
that his actions do not conflict with the interests of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Clarke, 2004). However, the agency theory does not explain all types of contextual 
disclosure. Disclosures made to protect company image or to promote company 
transparency for example, are explained by Stakeholder theory and Legitimacy theory. 
 
3.2.2 The Stakeholder Theory 
 
The stakeholder model regards a firm’s stakeholders to include: shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, customers, the government and the community as a whole (Freeman, 1984). 
According to the stakeholder view, an organisation is accountable to all its stakeholders 
(Clarke, 2004). The reason might be because it has a moral obligation, to be socially 
aware of the consequences of its activities, that arises from the organisation’s implied 
social contracts with society. The consequences may manifest in the form of external 
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pressure from government, pressure groups and some institutional investors for ethical 
investments and organisational change. 
 
However, the Stakeholder Theory has been labelled by its critics as a public relation tool 
due to its failure to take internal stakeholders on board although they also influence 
contextual disclosure. Adams and Larringa-Gonzalez (2007:333) suggests therefore that 
accountability and performance can be improved through the engagement of all 
stakeholders including internal ones by integrating sustainability issues into 
organisational processes and decision making. 
 
Another improvement to the model is proposed by Power (1991) who observed a link 
between the Stakeholder Theory and the Agency Theory and suggested that the Principal 
– AgentTheory could be adapted to include accountability of management to the society 
as a whole rather than to shareholders alone.This is already a case in South Africa, 
particularly in the mining industry where  mining companies sign the Social and Labour 
Plans(SLPs) as part of the mining license process.This development  supports the 
convergence of corporate governance and sustainability reporting. 
 
3.2.3 Legitimacy Theory 
 
Legitimacy theory shows that organisations disclose contextual information with the aim 
of being accepted by society (Deegan &Gordon, 1996).Applications of Legitimacy 
Theory are common in the social and environmental areas. De Villiers and Van Staden, 
(2006:763) observed that legitimate objectives may be served by changing the volume of 
environmental disclosure. Further to this, Brookhart, Beeler, and Culpepper (2005) 
observed that the issue of Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 92 in the USA led to an 
increase in environmental disclosure in the Chemical and Petroleum industry; which in 
terms of the Legitimacy Theory is a reactive legitimacy strategy. 
 
However, unlike the other two theories which focus on the interests of stakeholders, this 
theory focuses on the interest of the entity. Nevertheless, the three theories discussed 
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above, are related in that when an entity communicates with a view to influence its image 
to all its stakeholders, it may at the same time satisfy the information needs of the same 
stakeholders. Furthermore as Hill and Jones (1992, 29:2) document, the claim by the 
Stakeholder – Agency Theory that managers are agents of all stakeholders is an example 
of the link between the two theories. 
3.2.4 The GRI Reporting Framework 
 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Reporting Framework (The GRI Framework) 
provides the guidelines on how to report sustainability performance. The guidelines are 
intended to serve as a generally accepted framework for reporting an organisation’s 
economic, environmental and social performance; and are designed for use by any 
organisation irrespective of size, sector or location (GRI, 2006). 
 
The GRI Framework comprises of principles for defining report content, ensuring quality 
of reported information and setting the boundary of the reports (GRI, 2006). It also 
contains standard disclosures to be made. Organisations are thus allowed to use a 
reporting format of their choice so long as they cover the prescribed content and meet the 
set quality requirements. Lack of a generally accepted reporting format is a cause of 
concern to users because it renders the reports incomparable to some extent. However, 
since these guidelines are updated from time to time it is likely that standardisation will 
improve over time. 
 
The GRI Framework is regarded as generally accepted because its principles and standard 
disclosures have been developed from best practice after consulting a wide range of 
global stakeholders regarding issues relating to sustainability measurement and reporting. 
The sister frameworks such as the United Nation’s Global Compact Initiative and the 
Publish What You Pay Initiative are by and large not as popular as the GRI Framework 
(Buchanan, 2009). 
 
3.3 THE CONCEPT CONTEXTUAL DISCLOSURE 
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Contextual disclosure is defined as disclosure made available at the discretion of an entity 
or as disclosure not based on GAAP (Gouws &Cronje, 2008:114; Myburg, 2001:13). 
Various terms are used to describe contextual disclosure including;social and 
environmental reporting, social responsibility reporting, sustainability reporting, 
governance reporting and non-financial reporting. But by and large, the term ‘contextual 
disclosure’ is becoming generally accepted. 
 
The information that may be disclosed contextually is diverse. Contextual disclosure can 
be summarised as disclosure that includes economic, environmental and social aspects of 
the entities’ activities (Bennett &James, 1999:477).Contextual disclosure also include 
disclosure using frameworks such as the balanced score card (Kaplan & Norton,1992) the 
Enhanced Business Reporting Framework(2005) and disclosure that will contribute 
towards improved market efficiency, lower cost of capital, lower bid/ask spread, reduced 
price volatility and disclosure of human/intellectual capital (OECD, 2006:17). 
 
According to Gouws and Cronje (2008) contextual disclosure is also information on: 
value creation, forward-looking orientation, business environment, and strategy. It also 
includes information on key performance indicators, explanation of market trends and 
prospects and explanation of long-term objectives. Furthermore, it includes information 
which helps in understanding short-term strategic priorities to deliver objectives and 
principal risks and uncertainties that may have an impact on long-term prospects of the 
business. Such information helps reassure stakeholders regarding the entity’s 
performance and sustainability. 
 
The generation and disclosure of contextual information is believed to be based on the 
attributes of the new science model of the twenty first century model. Cronje (2007) 
summed up the features of the new science model as a non-linear thinking approach 
where connections and context influence activities and where transactions and events 
cannot be predicted precisely. The study also documented that the application of the 
attributes of the new science model generates contextual information and the methods of 
its disclosure. 
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3.4 THE EVOLUTION OF CONTEXTUAL DISCLOSURE 
 
Contextual disclosure has evolved incrementally over time through three main forms, 
namely voluntary disclosure of financial information, disclosure of non-financial 
information and disclosure of strategic and forward looking information (Meek, Roberts 
&Gray, 1995). This evolution is regarded as incremental in the sense that each new form 
of contextual disclosure adds to existing contextual disclosure rather than to replace it. 
3.4.1 Voluntary disclosure of financial information 
 
Voluntary disclosure of financial information is regarded to be the earliest form of 
contextual disclosure because it is driven by the share value maximisation model. Under 
the shareholder value view the responsibility of management is to maximise share value 
(Friedman, 1962; Ortas & Moneva, 2011). Early studies of voluntary disclosure show a 
link of voluntary disclosure of financial information to share value maximisation 
(Verrecchia, 2001). 
 
The information that is voluntarily disclosed under the shareholder value view is 
exclusively that which supplements mandatory disclosure. Typical disclosure under the 
shareholder value maximisation view include; the chairman’s report, the Management 
and Discussion Analysis (MDA) and the Operations and Financial Review. These 
disclosures comprise mostly of financial information and appear in the corporate annual 
reports (Gouws &Cronje, 2008).  
 
Initially most voluntary disclosure was not standardised as each corporate entity decided 
on what to disclose, having regard to its proprietary and information processing costs. 
However, due to the increasing importance of voluntary disclosure the Conceptual 
Framework and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
developed two standardised schemes of voluntary disclosure: IFRS Practice statement 
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Management Commentary (MC) and the Enhanced Business Reporting Framework 
(EBRF) respectively. 
 
The MC is a voluntary narrative report which prescribes the disclosure of non-GAAP 
information that the Conceptual Framework recognises as equally important in meeting 
the information needs of the users (Deloitte, 2010). The usefulness of the MC derives 
from its two principles, namely the ‘supplement and compliment financial statements 
information principle and the provide management’s view of the entity’s performance, 
position and progress principle’ (IASB, 2010:8). 
 
The ‘supplement and compliment financial statement principle’ requires the inclusion of 
additional explanations of amounts reported in financial statements and explanations of 
the conditions and events that shaped the information in financial statements; as well as 
the inclusion of financial and non-financial information about the business and its 
performance that is not reported  in the financial statements(IASB, 2010). 
 
The ‘provide management’s view on the entity’s performance, position and progress 
principle’ is complied with by providing a narrative explanation of a company’s financial 
statements that enables investors to see the company through the eyes of management 
(IASB, 2010). The logic being that the information that is important in managing the 
business is the same information that is important to investors in assessing the business’s 
performance and future prospects (IASB, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, the IASB (2010) states that MC is information that accompanies an entity’s 
financial reports to explain the entity’s current and future trends as well as factors 
underlying its development and its current and future performance and position. Since the 
Conceptual Framework users require both historical and forward-looking information in 
order to make economic decisions, compliance with ‘provide management’s view on the 
entity’s performance, position and progress principle’ enables investors to see the 
organisation through the eyes of management, the directors’ future strategies and goals as 
well as how and the extent to which they are oriented to the future (IASB, 2010). 
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Further to the above, for the MC to be useful it should possess the qualitative 
characteristics similar to those required for the general purpose financial statements 
(IASB, 2010). However, because each entity is permitted to disclose its own type of 
information differently, the ‘comparability’ attribute is used in contextual disclosure 
restrictively for intra-firm comparisons rather than for inter-firm comparisons (IASB, 
2010). 
 
In contrast, the Enhanced Business Reporting Framework (EBRF) is a scheme of 
voluntary disclosure that has been developed by the Enhanced Business Reporting 
Consortium (EBRC), of which the AICPA is a member (Tackett, Wolf & Kinskey, 2007). 
This Framework, as it is commonly known, is based on the shareholder value/agency 
theory and was prompted by studies that showed that 25% of company market value was 
attributed to its accounting book value, while the remaining 75% of its market value was 
explained by intangible assets, strategy, people and customer loyalty (Tackett et al, 
2007). 
 
The EBRF requires the disclosure of key issues for a number of prescribed items in the 
form of management perspectives, discussions, analysis, descriptions, statement of 
factors, recognition of intangible assets not reflected in the statement of financial 
position, and identification of factors. Furthermore, the framework is divided along four 
categories of business reporting information namely business landscape, strategy, and 
competencies and resources, and performance. The EBRC (2005) has produced 
taxonomy for using the framework while the AICPA has produced a package for 
implementing the Framework (Tackett et al, 2007). 
 
3.4.2 Corporate governance reporting 
 
Corporate governance can be defined in many ways. On the one hand, the OECD 
(Clarke, 2004:1) defines corporate governance as the system by which business 
corporations are directed and controlled (Cardbury’s report). On the other hand, the 
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commission on Global Governance (Grandori, 2004:2), views corporate governance as 
‘A continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be 
accommodated’, while Marshall, McManus, and Viele (2007:377) document that 
corporate governance includes business ethics, social responsibility, equitable treatment 
of stakeholders, full and fair disclosure and responsibility of the board of directors and its 
various committees. 
 
Despite the lack of a generally accepted definition of corporate governance, there is 
agreement regarding its purpose. According to Clarke (2004:7) corporate governance 
emerged primarily to mitigate agency costs caused by the opportunistic behaviour of 
management. This view is shared by Moloi (2008) and Shlifer &Vishney (1997). 
Accordingly, the early corporate governance mechanisms took the form of internal 
monitoring mechanisms such as administrative controls, disclosure of the directors’ 
remuneration, audit fees, directors’ loans and related party transactions, most of which 
were disclosed as notes to financial statements. 
 
The above forms of governance mechanisms prevailed for many decades until the period 
2000 to 2002 when a global wave of financial scandals and corporate failures (Coffee, 
2005; Kolk, 2008:3) made shareholders and regulatory agencies question the way 
corporations were directed and controlled (Buchanan, 2009:3). This marked the 
beginning of the second form of corporate governance that focused solely on ethical 
issues such as an effective board, compensation contracts that encourage shareholder 
orientation, concentrated ownership holding that led to active monitoring, risk 
management and internal controls, internal audit, accounting and auditing, as well as 
relationship with company shareholders (Moloi, 2008).  
 
A number of national and international codes of corporate governance were as a result  
introduced, all of them focusing on monitoring how companies are managed; including 
the OECD code, the King I code (IOD, 1994) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. While most of 
the codes were voluntary a few were mandatory, thus confirming the observation by 
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Gouws and Cronje (2008) that some contextual disclosures may eventually transform into 
mandatory disclosures. 
 
The third form of corporate governance was prompted by several factors including 
shareholders’ level of awareness, the emergence of knowledge based companies and a 
growing realisation of the importance of the stakeholder-relations such as employee 
relations, customer relations and supplier relations, and the community, as well as the 
realisation that shareholders own equity rather than the assets of the business (Blair, 
1995; Clarke, 2004); and a further realisation that the organisation was an open system 
rather than a closed one. 
 
At this point in time, the definition of an organisation also completely changed. The 
organisation was thus redefined as an institutional arrangement for governing 
relationships between parties that contribute firm-specific assets namely, the 
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, community and the public, who are the 
organisation’s stakeholders. The objective of the firm became maximisation of the wealth 
of stakeholders, making the organisation accountable to its stakeholders and at the same 
time changing the role of management from managing the assets to managing 
relationships (Grandori, 2004).  
 
The corporate governance mechanisms that were introduced to deal with these changes 
took the form of external monitoring mechanisms focusing on environmental and social 
responsibility reporting with the high profile bodies such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and 
the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IOD) among others, as the global role-
players in the development of this type of contextual disclosure (Grandori, 2004:323-
324).  
 
3.4.3 Sustainability reporting 
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The issue of sustainable development and performance of entities became a concern 
hardly before the social and environmental disclosures began to become an accepted 
practice. This was after realising that entities were operating without caring about issues 
such as climate change and empowerment of disadvantaged communities and 
environmental degradation. At this point Sustainability reporting and several important 
non-financial reporting initiatives such as Global Reporting initiatives and 
AccountAbility emerged (Eccles, Cheung & Saltzman, 2011:1). 
 
Sustainability reporting is not a new phenomenon; it has existed in several forms of 
corporate reporting such as voluntary disclosure in the corporate annual reports and other 
independent reports over the past four decades. However, its present form started in the 
1970s and 1980s as social accounting practices designed to disclose responses to 
stakeholders’ social concerns, and as practices disclosing how firms susceptible to 
environmental incidents such, as petrol and chemical companies, were responding to the 
concerns of the United Nations and environmental organisations (Ortas &Moneva, 2011).  
 
The subsequent realisation by firms that through sustainability reporting they can 
improve not only their image but also their internal processes, engage stakeholders and 
persuade investors; has made sustainability reporting become a very important practice. 
Surprisingly though, despite several years of existence, there is no single universally 
accepted definition of sustainability reporting. For example KPMG (2008:8) views 
sustainability reporting as a broad term used to describe a company’s reporting on its 
economic, environmental and social performance, while the Global Reporting Initiative 
GRI (2006) defines sustainability reporting more practically as the art of measuring, 
disclosing and being accountable to internal and external stakeholders for organisational 
performance towards the goal of sustainable development. 
 
Despite a lack of a generally accepted definition, sustainability reporting continues to 
attract the interest of researchers in various aspects, including measurement, reporting, 
standardisation, assurance and conceptual issues. Kolk (2008:1) for example, found a link 
between corporate governance and sustainability reporting and suggested that 
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stakeholders would be better served if the two reporting systems are integrated. However, 
Margolis and Walsh (2003) questioned whether integration would meet the conflicting 
information needs of all stakeholders. Nevertheless, integrated reporting has since been 
developed and is covered in chapter 4 of this study (Kolk 2008:1). 
 
In yet another study Adams and McNicholas (2007:399) contend that there is lack of 
engaging research in the field of sustainability accounting and reporting and attribute it to 
concerns about the increasing breadth of participants in the social accounting agenda and 
managerial capture. Adams and McNicholas (2007:394) then argue that action research 
on sustainability reporting can identify how accounting and management systems can 
reduce their negative sustainability impacts. 
 
Furthermore, Adams (2002) and Parker (2005:849) contend that the two elements of 
sustainability reporting, namely the social and environmental reporting, have been 
developed without engaging organisations that do sustainability reporting; despite the 
findings in previous studies that revealed that the reporting process, attitude of 
participants and corporate culture play an important part in determining the extent of 
accountability discharged through disclosures. However, it is argued that earlier 
deductive research approaches might have contributed to this situation (Parker, 2005:856; 
Adams &Larringa-Gonzalez, 2007). 
 
The assurance of sustainability reporting is another area that has been the focus of 
studies. According to KPMG (2008), although the assurance for sustainability reporting 
is in its formative stage, more companies are recognising that independent assurance 
enhances the transparency and credibility of their sustainability reporting. Assurance of 
sustainability reports delivers value not only to the reporting company but also to users of 
published sustainability reports and broader stakeholder groups and individuals (CPA, 
2007; Dando &Swift, 2003). An increase in the assurance of sustainability reporting has 
thus been observed (FEE, 2006:7; IFAC, 2006).This rise is a result of increased 
availability of auditing guidelines issued by bodies such as AccountAbility, the European 
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Federation of Accountants and the Global Reporting Initiative (FEE, 2006; Kolk, 2008; 
NIVRA, 2004; Zadek & Raynard, 2004). 
 
However, Hassan, Maijoor, Mock, Roebuck and Simmett (2005) and IFAC (2002) note 
that despite these developments, academic research on these novel forms of non-financial 
assurance services has been scarce so far and thus the cause of a limited understanding of 
the nature and extent of this emergent auditing practice.  
 
Another aspect of sustainability reporting that has been studied is the increasing 
integration of sustainability information into investment decisions by the institutional 
investment community (Solomon &Solomon,2006).The Socially Responsible Investment 
Initiatives (SRI), EUROSIF (2003), the Global Compact (2004) with ranking indexes like 
the Dow Jones’s Sustainability Index and the FTSE4Good Index are typical attempts to 
integrate social and environmental information into the mainstream investment decision. 
Further to this, a private environmental, social and governance (ESG) Index, introduced 
by Goldman Sachs, supports investment analysts in ranking companies according to five 
distinct corporate responsibility (CSR) performance areas (Kolk&Perego, 2006); which 
are: environmental concerns, community and society, employees and supply chain, 
customers and governance. 
 
Further development in sustainability reporting relates to the reporting format. KPMG 
(2007) documents that unlike financial statements; sustainability is reported with greater 
flexibility. The emphasis is more on delivery of known reporting objectives, alignment 
with the company’s overall communication style and position, and engages with the 
target audience in a manner that promotes dialogue and dissemination of relevant 
information rather than on the reporting formats. However, three formats are emerging 
namely, the shorter and more concise reports often supported by detailed online sources, 
reports extending beyond narrow emphasis on compliance and risk management into 
value chain and sphere of influence issues; and formats exhibiting a combination of the 
hard copy sustainability report, interactive online sustainability report and downloadable 
PDF’s. Irrespective of the format used, separate reporting elements are being directed at 
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different stakeholder groups rather than adopting a one size fits all approach (KPMG, 
2008:5). 
 
Considering the flexibility, as well as the cultural and political issues involved in 
sustainability reporting, it is debatable to what extend sustainability reports from different 
reporting environments such as Botswana and South Africa can be comparable. However, 
in view of the fact that Botswana is a neighbouring country to South Africa and is 
developing a code of corporate governance that is similar to that of South Africa, the 
corporate governance checklist developed by King III can be used to assess the 
comparability of contextual disclosure of Botswana and South Africa. Furthermore, the 
comparative study of contextual disclosure of Botswana and South Africa listed 
companies can be informed by previous empirical studies that looked at cross-country 
differences in corporate sustainability reporting such as Kolk (2005), Maignan and 
Ralston (2002), as well as Berthelot, Cormier and Magnan (2003). 
 
3.5 CONTEXTUAL DISCLOSURE IN BOTSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
3.5.1 Contextual disclosure in developing countries 
 
Studies on contextual disclosure have mostly concentrated on developed countries such 
as the USA, Australia and European countries. Very few studies have been conducted in 
developing countries. Furthermore companies in developed countries are believed to 
make more contextual disclosure than companies in developing countries and one of the 
reasons given is that stakeholders in developing countries are less aware of environmental 
and social issues than their counterparts in developed countries(Doppegieter &De 
Villiers, 1996:77). 
 
At the same time Adams and Larringa-Gonzalez (2007) warn that it is very dangerous to 
generalise the results of studies in developed countries to developing countries, because 
of the differences in the levels of awareness about sustainability problems. Their study 
thus contends that action research on sustainability performance and reporting is what 
developing countries need. 
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Sustainability studies have been conducted in South Africa and other developing countries 
including Brazil, Chile, Singapore, Tanzania (Abayo, Adams & Roberts, 1993), as well as in 
Bangladesh (Belal &Owen, 2007).  However, South Africa is among a few developing countries 
with a code on corporate governance and where some empirical studies on contemporary 
contextual disclosure issues have been conducted (De Villiers &Van Staden, 2004). 
3.5.2 Contextual disclosure in South Africa 
 
South Africa’s King III code of corporate governance is based on the “apply or explain” 
principle and on the Stakeholder theory, as such it ranks among the best codes of 
corporate governance in the world. The King III code requires company management to 
apply their collective mind in identifying; company stakeholders, their legitimate 
expectations and in developing strategies that meet stakeholder expectations while at the 
same time maximising the firm’s value (IOD, 2009). 
 
According to King III (IOD, 2009), governance, strategy and sustainability are 
inseparable, and when corporate governance principles are mindfully applied or their 
non-application honestly explained, the result is good corporate governance. Another 
requirement of the King III code is the disclosure of financial information, governance, 
and sustainability performance, separately as well as in an integrated manner (IOD, 
2009). 
 
Although the King III code is essentially voluntary, the South African Companies Act 
requirement for all listed companies to adopt the code has rendered the code mandatory 
(IOD, 2009). This statutory compliance requirement on listed companies is at variance 
with the practice in other countries where contextual disclosure is voluntary.  
 
Apart from the existence of a code of corporate governance a number of studies have 
been carried out on contextual disclosure in South Africa. The extant studies on voluntary 
disclosure in South Africa focus on a number of issues including:informativeness of 
voluntary disclosure (Myburg, 2001), transformation of contextual disclosure (Gouws 
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&Cronje, 2008), patterns and levels of voluntary disclosure and trends in sustainability 
reporting (De Villiers &Van Staden, 2004). Furthermore, De Villiers and Van Staden 
(2004) observe that the local South African referred journals that contain information on 
voluntary disclosure are not searchable through international data bases, and this is one of 
the obstacles faced by foreign researchers. 
 
However, according to De Villiers and Van Staden (2004) the few studies that are 
accessible reveal two types of studies, content analyses and questionnaire type of 
research. Content analyses focus on differences in disclosure (Doppegieter &De Villiers, 
1996; De Villiers & Lubbe, 2001; Moloi, 2008), while the longitudinal content types of 
studies focus on the trend of contextual disclosure (Van Niekerk, 1996; De Villiers, 2000; 
De Villiers & Barnard, 2000). 
 
The questionnaire type of studies such as the one by De Vries and De Villiers (2003), 
which are mostly perception-based, reveal that 89% of management were in favour of 
more environmental reporting on a voluntary basis while 58% were in favour of 
compulsory environmental reporting. Another study by Myburg (2001) revealed that 
voluntary disclosure was informative, while a study by Gouws and Cronje (2008) 
revealed that corporate accounting practices including contextual disclosure were in a 
state of transition. 
 
Furthermore, a study by De Villiers and Van Staden (2004) indicates that overall the 
disclosure of environmental information of both mining and the top 100 companies 
increased from 1994 to 1999, but decreased thereafter until 2002. Furthermore, the study 
shows that the publication of general and specific information also increased from 1994 
to 1999 but then the disclosure of specific information declined five times more than the 
disclosure of general information during the same period. However, to-date there is no 
comparative study of South African listed companies’ level and trend of voluntary 
disclosure relative to companies in other countries, especially Botswana. 
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3.5.3 Contextual Disclosure in Botswana 
 
In contrast to the South African reporting environment, the landscape of voluntary 
disclosure in Botswana is unknown due to lack of information and lack of a national 
corporate governance code. However, there are significant developments taking place. 
First the Botswana code of corporate governance modelled on King III is still in the 
making. Second, studies on voluntary disclosure are beginning to emerge. One such a 
study by Rankokwane (2008) evaluated the role of supreme audit institutions in 
promoting environmental accountability in Botswana and reported that there is an audit 
expectation gap. Another study by Mbekomizeand Wally-Dima, (2013) documents that 
social and environmental reporting exists in Botswana listed entities and parastatals. The 
study also reveals that listed companies tend to disclose more than parastatals; and 
size,type of industry and ownership are notgood predictors of the level of environmental 
disclosure in Botswana. This limited literature on contextual disclosure of Botswana 
listed companies is stated in chapter one of this study as one of the reasons for 
undertaking this study. 
 
3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter defines Contextual disclosure as a voluntary disclosure of financial and non- 
financial information to complement financial statements, in order to meet the 
information needs of stakeholders and to achieve the entity’s strategic objectives. The 
information disclosed includes non-financial information, historical information as well 
as forward-looking, quantitative and qualitative information. 
 
Contextual disclosure has evolved incrementally over time through three forms: 
voluntary disclosure of economic information through a Management Commentary, 
Operations and Financial Reviews or as information disclosed through the Enhanced 
Business Reporting Framework; disclosure of corporate governance such as internal 
monitoring mechanisms, compliance with ethical codes or social and environmental 
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performance; and sustainability reporting, the disclosure of economic, social and 
environmental performance. 
 
A number of theories and frameworks that underlie contextual disclosure have been 
examined. The theories that explain and predict contextual disclosure are the Agency 
theory, the Stakeholder theory and the Legitimacy theory. The Agency Theory proposes 
that contextual disclosures are made to mitigate agency costs while the Stakeholder 
theory proposes that contextual disclosure is made to deliver accountability to 
stakeholders. Legitimacy theory argues that firms disclose contextual information in 
order to manage their operational legitimacy. The frameworks that prescribe how 
contextual disclosure should be include: the Management Commentary, the Enhanced 
Business Reporting Framework and the GRI Guidelines. 
 
South Africa is regarded to be one of the few developing countries that have made 
significant advances in contextual disclosure. The King III code of corporate governance, 
which is one of the best codes in the world together with the new South African 
Companies Act (2008), provides a sound framework of contextual reporting in South 
Africa. Further to this, a number of empirical studies have been conducted covering 
contextual disclosure issues such as patterns, trends, informativeness and transformation 
of contextual disclosure. However, there is scant literature on comparative contextual 
disclosure; as such it is not easy to assess how South African listed companies’ 
contextual disclosure compare with that of companies in other countries. 
 
In contrast to South Africa, Botswana’s code of corporate governance is still evolving 
and very few empirical studies have been conducted on contextual disclosure in 
Botswana, let alone comparative studies. This state of affairs points to the significance of 
this study which is stated in chapter one. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
INTEGRATED REPORTING 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Mandatory disclosure and contextual disclosure discussed in chapters two and three 
respectively constitute what is known as traditional corporate reporting. This system of 
reporting is also called a separate reports system, because two types of disclosure namely 
mandatory disclosures and contextual disclosures are presented separately in the 
corporate annual report. When information about the same entity is provided this way, 
users must have the capability to synthesise the two types of information in order to 
obtain information that is useful for decision making. However, there is no empirical 
evidence to that effect. Nevertheless, until recently, traditional disclosure was the main 
source of corporate information. Although traditional corporate reporting has been the 
main source of corporate information for many years, it has failed to meet the 
expectations of all stakeholders who provide the business with resources. According to 
the concept of stewardship capital (Eccles, Cheung&Saltzman, 2011) the resources that a 
business uses constitute six types of capital namely financial capital, manufactured 
capital, human capital, intellectual capital, social capital and natural capital (IRC, 2011; 
KPMG, 2011). Traditional corporate reporting has been focusing primarily on the 
information needs of the providers of financial capital, thus ignoring the information 
needs of other stakeholders. Issues such as sustainability, environmental degradation, 
effects of climate change, and poverty, have not been adequately addressed by traditional 
corporate reporting. 
 
Traditional corporate reporting has also not been able to cope with the so called 21st 
century- transactions, including intangible assets, intellectual capital and financial 
instruments, which require new principles not provided for by traditional corporate 
reporting. Furthermore, traditional corporate reporting has not been able to communicate 
the business strategy and other drivers of business value and performance to third parties. 
Business strategy and key performance indicators have thus tended to remain inside 
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information thus perpetuating the very information asymmetry that corporate reporting 
strives to eliminate(ICAEW, 2009). 
 
Attempts to improve transparency through International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs), social, environmental and governance accounting, has made traditional 
corporate reporting narrow, isolated, long and complex, rule bound rather than principles 
based. This is believed to have led to poor decisions by stakeholders, higher cost of 
capital to the business and poor relation with stakeholders, as well as unsustainable 
business operations (Eccles, Cheung & Saltzman, 2011).Accordingly, efforts to deal with 
these challenges have led some innovative companies to start publishing integrated 
reports. 
 
Two Danish companies, Novozymes and Novo Nordisk, and four US companies, United 
Technologies, American Electric Power, PepsiCo and Southwest Airlines, were among 
the first to adopt integrated reporting. Others are the Brazilian cosmetics and fragrance 
company Natura and the Dutch health care and lighting company Phillips (Eccles, 
Cheung & Saltzman, 2011). As a consequence of these developments, a lot of questions 
are being asked, such as: what is integrated reporting, what are its benefits, how can it be 
implemented and assured and what are the challenges faced? 
 
This chapter discusses the concept of integrated reporting, the benefits of integrated 
reporting, and implementation of integrated reporting as well as its trend globally and in 
South Africa; and in Botswana where this study has been conducted. Furthermore, the 
chapter highlights the lack of literature about the comparative quality of integrated 
reporting between companies listed on the JSE and those listed on the BSE.  
 
4.2 THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATED REPORTING 
 
Different views of the concept integrated reporting have been documented. In what has 
become known as a one report concept,Eccleset al (2011:34) view integrated reporting as 
presenting and explaining a company’s financial and non-financial, environmental, social 
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and governance information in a single report. However, KPMG (2011) observes that a 
single report concept assumes that all stakeholders’ information needs are met by one 
report, which may not always be the case; and argues that a single document is not a 
prerequisite of integrated reporting except for companies seeking to use the integrated 
report to fulfil regulatory obligations. 
 
KPMG (2011) views integrated reporting as an activity of reporting that provides capital 
markets with relevant information about the company’s strategy and its holistic-historic 
performance, as well as with other relevant information that helps users to assess the 
business pressure including risks in attaining its performance targets, in the short, 
medium and long term, concisely and in a manner that shows interdependence between 
business strategy, performance drivers and performance. Integrated reporting is thus a 
kind of reporting that delivers real value. Its efficacy in delivering values lies in its 
philosophy that performance flows from a company strategy and targets set. Accordingly, 
under integrated reporting different reports and reporting media may be used depending 
on their effectiveness in communicating information to the target audience (KPMG, 
2011; KPMG, 2008:24). Furthermore, integrated reporting is a shift from reporting 
financial and non-financial information in two separate reports to reporting on the impact 
a company has on its stakeholders. It involves reporting all types of relevant information 
for assessing and evaluating a company’s quality, performance and value and impact 
comprehensively (Deloitte, 2011). Relevant performance information is reported for a set 
of factors including economic, social, environmental, governance and other relevant 
business impact factors, while at the same time taking into account the business strategy. 
 
In contrast to the above views of integrated reporting, King III (IOD, 2009) defines 
integrated reporting as a holistic and integrated representation of the company’s 
performance in terms of both finance and sustainability. Adding to the clarity of the 
concept, the Integrated Reporting Committee (IRC, 2011) of South Africa distinguishes 
between integrated reporting and an integrated report by viewing integrated reporting as a 
process, while an integrated report is the output from the process. However, both the 
King (III) code (IOD, 2009) and the Integrated Reporting Committee (IRC) (2011) regard 
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the integrated report as the organisation’s primary report.KPMG (2011) sums up the 
features of integrated reporting as; greater transparency, accounting for all forms of 
capital, focusing on both the past and the future, is connected and strategic, covers the 
short, medium and long term, is concise and is technology enabled. These features make 
integrated reporting more able to meet stakeholders’ information needs than traditional 
reporting and make integrated reporting a replacement of traditional corporate reporting. 
However, as these features may not be attained in the early stages of integrated reporting, 
some elements of traditional corporate reporting may not be replaced by integrated 
reporting in the short run. 
 
From the foregoing observation, it is apparent that integrated reporting is a replacement 
of traditional corporate reporting. This is so because as long as it meets the information 
needs of investors and other stakeholders, then the information reported elsewhere 
becomes irrelevant (KPMG, 2011). 
 
4.3 THE BENEFITS OF INTEGRATED REPORTING 
 
If the weaknesses of traditional corporate reporting as explained above have been the 
driving force towards integrated reporting, then the potential benefits from integrated 
reporting have added the momentum to its adoption. As extant literature shows, different 
types of benefits may accrue not only to the company adopting integrated reporting but 
also to its stakeholders as well as to society as a whole. The primary benefit of integrated 
reporting is a more holistic view of the information relevant to the company and its value 
proposition and strategy(David, Liv, & Mike, 2011; IRC, 2011). Eccles, Cheung and 
Saltzman (2011) identify three classes of secondary benefits to the company. The first 
comprises of internal benefits including better resource allocation decisions, greater 
engagement with shareholders and other stakeholders, and lower reputational risk. The 
second class consists of external market benefits, including meeting the information 
needs of the main stream investors through sustainability indices and ensuring that non-
financial information from vendors is accurate. The third class is a better management of 
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regulatory risk including complying with a wave of global regulations, responding to 
requests from stock exchanges and participating in integrated reporting forums. 
 
Implementing comprehensive integrated reporting requires among others formulation of a 
business strategy if one does not exist, setting business goals and targets, performance 
indicators, standardisation of information sources, as well as reviewing and improving 
business processes benefits. According to KPMG (2011) standardisation of information 
sources yields several benefits to the business including, assisting management to more 
effectively access, analyse and report information that is strategically relevant to the 
company’s long-term performance and value, and elimination of manual and similar 
unnecessary processes. Other benefits are that users of information are able to pull 
relevant information into their integrated report from across a wide range of disparate 
sources and that the company can easily migrate its compliance reporting process from a 
paper based format to the internet and use technologies such as the Extensive Business 
Reporting Language (KPMG, 2011).Additional benefits to the company from 
implementing integrated reporting include: greater clarity, consistency and reliability to 
corporate information, ability to attract business opportunities, mitigation of operational 
risks and safeguarding of company reputation. Other benefits include company 
demonstration of commitment to sustainable performance and enhanced company ability 
to educate stakeholders (IRC, 2011; Deloitte, 2011; Eccles, Cheung & Saltzman, 2011). 
 
The company’s stakeholders benefit too from improved transparency, with which they 
are able to make optimal decisions regarding their resources. Investors for example are 
able through the capital markets to understand the company’s strategy and performance 
and make the right investment decisions, while the society as a whole benefits from 
sustainable economic, social and environmental information that result from integrated 
reporting (Eccles, Cheung & Saltzman, 2011).Since integrated reporting is at its early 
stage, most of the benefits of integrated reporting discussed above are potential benefits 
to be confirmed when integrated reporting becomes fully developed. These benefits can 
thus be regarded simply as the motives for integrated reporting. However, evidence from 
early adopters of integrated reporting show that the benefits are realisable. 
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4.4 IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATED REPORTING 
 
The above discussion of the concept of integrated reporting and the potential benefits of 
integrated reporting can help management to build up the case for adopting integrated 
reporting. It does not in any way help management implement integrated reporting. To 
implement integrated reporting management must understand the implementation 
process, which until now has not been prescribed by the integrated reporting frameworks. 
Van der Helm (2011) suggests two perspectives to consider in the roadmap to integrated 
reporting, the management perspective and the communication perspective. 
 
According to the management perspective the road to integrated reporting starts with 
anchoring sustainability in the business strategy. This involves making a fair assessment 
of the level of integration of sustainability in the business strategy, and then embedding it 
in the strategy where it is found to be lacking. The other issue to review is the availability 
of metrics to measure progress and quality of related information systems. However, 
some metrics may be developed as integrated reporting develops. The commitment to 
integrated reporting by top management is critical at this stage (Van der Helm, 2010; 
IRC, 2011).The communicative perspective considers meeting the needs of those who 
use the report for decision making as the most compelling argument for integrated 
reporting. Accordingly integrated reporting should start with a process of assessing 
stakeholders’ needs, and setting appropriate communication channels such as panels, 
forums and polls that are necessary for communicating on a continuous basis (Van der 
Helm, 2010; KPMG, 2011). 
 
The two perspectives however do not cover the entire process of implementing integrated 
reporting rather they merely discuss the initial considerations. The IRC (2011) of South 
Africa in its implementation guidance presents the implementation process in nine steps. 
These steps however, focus on the reporting aspects only and omit important 
organisational issues such as strategy formulation. From the two perspectives discussed 
above and the IRC steps the process of implementing integrated reporting can be 
alternatively viewed as involving four classes of issues, namely organisational issues, 
data collection issues, assurance issues and reporting issues. 
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4.4.1 Organisational issues 
 
Organisational issues concern the preparation that must be put in place in order to 
implement integrated reporting. According to KPMG (2011) the implementation of 
integrated reporting should be regarded as a change management issue requiring the full 
support of top management and should be assigned to a multidisciplinary committee. The 
committee should understand the principles and elements of integrated reporting and its 
benefits and use the benefits to build up a business case for adopting integrated reporting. 
 
Besides according full support to integrated reporting the executive team should know the 
extent to which an integrated report differs from existing financial and sustainability 
reports and should understand that an integrated report is not the same as a combined 
report. In addition, the executive structure should appreciate the expectation that it will 
apply its collective mind in identifying the social, environmental, economic, and financial 
issues that affect the organisation’s ability to create and maintain value (IRC, 2011; 
KPMG, 2011).Furthermore, since integrated reporting is strategy driven, management 
should develop an overall business strategy, set performance targets and appropriate 
performance indicators as well as other supporting strategies. Further to the above 
management should determine material risks and opportunities that impact on the 
organisation’s ability to create and sustain value. All risks and opportunities that are 
material to the current and anticipated activities of the organisation should be determined 
and the process of determining them documented for inclusion in the integrated report 
(IRC, 2011). 
 
Management should also put in place internal systems to accurately capture and monitor 
performance in terms of relevant economic, environmental, and social and governance 
information, related risks and opportunities (IRC, 2011). The process of developing a 
data capture system should include among others a review of relevant financial, social, 
environmental and governance issues and trends and decisions about the form of data 
whether structured or unstructured, standardised or not, paper based or electronic; and the 
appropriate metrics and technology to process data  (Van der Helm, 2010; IRC, 2011). 
Furthermore, since dialogue with stakeholders is critical in integrated reporting, a 
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communication system should be put in place to ensure responsiveness with the 
organisation’s key stakeholders. This is not only a means of obtaining valuable inputs 
from the key stakeholders but also a means of building trust with them and enhances the 
organisation’s value (Van der Helm, 2010; KPMG, 2011). 
 
Planning the reporting process and defining the scope and boundary of reporting is also a 
critical organisational issue. This involves management drawing up a plan to deliver an 
integrated report, indicating the deliverables, time frames, assigned roles and 
responsibilities; including provision for final approval by the governing structure (Van 
der Helm, 2010; IRC, 2011). 
 
Assurance is another critical consideration in integrated reporting because it lends 
credibility to it. According to IRC (2011) an appropriate assurance process must be 
developed and implemented. Since the assurance process for financial information is well 
established, focus should be on assurance of the non-financial environmental, social and 
governance information. Auditors and other assurance providers should be engaged right 
from the outset to establish the aspects of integrated reporting that will be subjected to 
assurance (IRC, 2011). 
 
4.4.2 Data collection issues 
 
The data collection issues to deal with include capturing financial and non-financial data, 
the relevant governance, social and environmental data, at the right time and managing it. 
Van der Helm (2010) documents that this is easy as long as the information needs of 
stakeholders have been identified (Van der Helm, 2010). Since there is no guidance on 
metrics to capture such data, help may have to be obtained from standard setting 
organisations such as the International Standards Organisation (ISO), Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), and the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) Reporting 
Framework. The organisations may also learn from their own peculiar experiences. 
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4.4.3 Reporting issues 
 
The reporting issues to consider include compiling and structuring the integrated report, 
assuring the report, having the report approved and publishing the report (IRC, 2011). 
These issues should be dealt with in compliance with reporting strategies set up at the 
organisational stage as explained above (KPMG, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, the structuring and compiling of an integrated report should be in line with 
the principles and guidelines provided by the IRC Discussion Paper as well as examples 
of leading reporting practices locally(KPMG, 2011) and internationally. Further to this, 
the style and content of the report should be engaging and easy to read, focusing on 
material issues and facilitating comparison with peers and with own performance year on 
year (IRC, 2011). 
 
The IRC of South Africa(IRC, 2011:22) and the International Integrated Reporting 
committee (IIRC, 2011) document that as part of ensuring that the reported information is 
credible, the integrated report should be assured according to the assurance process in 
place before submitting it to the governing structure for approval. According to the IRC 
(2011:17) in case of listed companies the audit committee is tasked with the 
responsibility of oversight and thus expected to approve all material issues identified and 
ensure that the information reported is reliable and that there are no material conflicts 
when compared with financial results. Once the report has been assured it should be 
submitted to the governing structure for approval and then published. Each organisation 
should choose suitable media of communicating the integrated report, including media 
announcements, formal launch, or websites (IRC, 2011:22). 
 
According to previous studies on corporate reporting, mandatory disclosure and 
contextual disclosure were the main focus of corporate reporting research. However, with 
the emergence of integrated reporting as the primary form of corporate reporting, the 
focus of corporate disclosure studies also changes. Accordingly, all the research 
questions posed in chapter one of this study will be answered by a comparative study of 
the quality of integrated reporting of the listed companies in question. 
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4.5 GLOBAL TRENDS IN INTEGRATED REPORTING 
 
A documented global trend in integrated reporting has been the increasing number of 
bodies involved in promoting integrating reporting. Regulatory bodies, individual 
countries, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO’s) as well as the academia are 
promoting integrated reporting. The regulatory bodies that promote integrated reporting 
include the EU Directive on Transparency which requires companies to report on relevant 
CSR information (KPMG, 2010:2) and the King Code of Corporate Governance (IOD, 
2009) which requires all listed companies in South Africa to publish integrated reports. 
Furthermore, individual countries including Denmark, France and the USA emphasise 
integrated reporting, but by and large the rate of regulating integrated reporting remains 
low though it is increasing.  
 
The non-governmental organisations that promote integrated reporting include, The 
Prince of Wales Accounting for Sustainability project, The IRC of South Africa, the 
International (IIRC), AccountAbility and the Climate Disclosure Standards Board and the 
GRI. Others are the World Bank, the IASB and IFAC. Although each of these 
organisations has its own goals, the overall effect of the pursuit of these goals promotes 
integrated reporting. 
 
The Prince of Wales Accounting for Sustainability project was established in 2004 as an 
initiative aimed at ensuring that sustainability is actually embedded in the organisations 
rather than merely talked and worried about. Since its inception the project has come up 
with a number of initiatives including the call for organisations to meet the 21stcentury 
challenges with contemporary decision making and reporting systems and its advocacy 
for a connected reporting approach. These initiatives culminated in the development of 
the Connected Reporting Framework (KPMG, 2010). Further to this, the Prince of Wales 
Accounting for Sustainability project was one of the founding members of the 
International Integrating Reporting Committee (IIRC, 2011) 
 
Another global milestone in the development of integrated reporting was the creation of 
the IRC of South Africa in 2011. To date the IRC has published a discussion paper on 
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integrated reporting covering a number of issues including, the definition of integrated 
reporting, the objectives of integrated reporting, the principles of integrated reporting and 
users of integrated reports. The discussion paper also covers the assurance of integrated 
reports and provides a general guidance in preparing integrated reports. Although the 
IRC’s main objective is to develop an integrated reporting framework for South African 
entities its activities have had a global effect on the development of integrated reporting 
(Eccles, Cheung & Saltzman, 2011). 
 
Following the establishment of the IRC was the establishment of the International 
Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC) in 2011 to develop a global integrated reporting 
framework. Since its establishment the IIRC has promoted integrated reporting through 
convergence, collaboration and conformance of emerging frameworks and standards. 
Furthermore, it has developed a discussion paper that paves the way to the establishment 
of a global integrated reporting framework (Deloitte, 2011). The introduction of 
integrated reporting related indices such as the JSE’s Socially Responsible Investment 
(SRI) index shows that investors may rely on integrated reporting in making decisions. 
However, it remains to be seen how other stakeholders such as employees, suppliers and 
communities will rely on integrated reporting under the IIRC Framework. 
 
Following developments in South Africa, AccountAbility for sustainability initiative was 
established in 2004 with an aim of developing practical guidance for organisations to link 
sustainability with business and financial strategies. In 2009 His Royal Majesty  the 
Prince of Wales called for a framework that would ensure that 21st century challenges are 
not faced with 20 century decision making and reporting systems. This was followed by a 
release of a Connected Reporting Framework in 2010 aimed at helping organisations 
integrate environmental and social features into management reporting, investor 
communication and the corporate annual report and accounts(KPMG, 2010; Eccles, 
Cheung & Saltzman, 2011). 
 
The NGO AccountAbility, which provides assurance on non-financial information using 
its AA1000 standards, and IFAC, which guides its members in handling integrated 
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reporting issues, are other global promoters of integrated reporting. The IASB’s IFRS 
Management commentary, that provides guidance on disclosure of non-financial 
information; the Climate Change Standards Board, which issues standards on climate 
change as well as the UN Global Compact, which guide members on strategic policy 
issues for business, all of them together represent an important global trend in integrated 
reporting. Both the IRC and the IIRC discussion papers appear to be very useful 
documents. However, the documents are based on the assumptions that companies are 
prepared for integrated reporting, in terms of their management systems and the 
information technology in place.  
 
Before an integrated reporting approach is adopted the organisation must have an 
integrated management system in place as well as the relevant information technology. 
Unfortunately these two prerequisites for integrated reporting are not addressed by the 
Discussion Paper (IRC,2011).Thus lack of integrated management systems and 
appropriate information technology may be one of the factors that hinder the 
implementation of integrated reporting. Furthermore, the multiplicity of organisations 
involved in integrated reporting appears to be a further hindrance to integrated reporting. 
However, considering the different dimensions of integrated reporting, the involvement 
of different organisations is an imperative, and this is where the role of the IIRC as a 
converger, enforcer and coordinator of integrated reporting comes in handy(Deloitte, 
2011). At national level the same pattern should be replicated with national integrated 
reporting committees coordinating different national integrated reporting initiatives. 
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4.6 INTEGRATED REPORTING IN SOUTH AFRICA AND BOTSWANA 
4.6.1 Integrated reporting in South Africa 
 
South Africa is among the few countries in the world which are at the fore front in 
integrated reporting. The King Code of Corporate Governance (King III) requires all 
listed companies in South Africa to publish integrated reports on an apply or explain 
basis; which means that companies that fail to apply the Code must disclose the reasons 
for not doing so. Furthermore, the IRC of South Africa has published a framework 
discussion paper that outlines the principles-based approach to Integrated Reporting and 
reports, and offers practical direction on the integrated report (IRC, 2011). 
 
In terms of adoption of Integrated Reporting South African companies have made some 
significant progress. According to Deloitte (2011) the average level of adoption of 
Integrated Reporting is 48%. However, there is no definitive Integrated Reporting as no 
company excels in all aspects of Integrated Reporting, though some companies that were 
studied revealed some pockets of excellence. 
 
4.6.2 Integrated Reporting in Botswana 
 
In contrast to South Africa, there is no literature about the state of Integrated Reporting in 
Botswana listed companies. Furthermore there is no evidence of initiatives to introduce 
Integrated Reporting in Botswana and the reasons why there are no initiatives are not 
known. It remains to be seen whether the long awaited Botswana code of corporate 
governance will introduce Integrated Reporting and make it mandatory to listed 
companies like in South Africa. The true picture of the landscape of integrated reporting 
in Botswana will be established by this study. 
 
4.6.3 Comparative Integrated Reporting 
 
Previous studies on cross-country corporate disclosure focused on traditional disclosure 
and most of them were conducted in developed countries. Of the few studies that were 
conducted in developed countries none of them involved Botswana or South African 
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listed companies. Yet, with globalisation, comparative disclosure cannot be ignored as it 
provides a means of benchmarking disclosure regimes against others with a view to 
improving the quality of disclosure. 
 
Since integrated reporting has become the primary form of disclosure, a comparative 
study of disclosure based on traditional disclosure has become irrelevant. This study thus 
focuses on comparative integrated disclosure. However, as there are no previous cross-
country studies of integrated disclosure to benchmark against, the study is original and 
limitations are inevitable.  
 
As explained above, the starting point in integrated reporting is to develop an integrated 
management system and then apply integrating reporting steps to produce an integrated 
report. Thus the difference in the state of integrated reporting could be either due to 
companies that possess an integrated reporting system without having developed an 
integrated management system, or to companies that have an integrated reporting system 
but have not grasped the process of integrated reporting. This study will establish whether 
the difference in the state of integrated reporting between Botswana and South Africa is 
due to integrated management factors or to factors relating to the reporting process. 
 
4.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Integrated Reporting was  defined as a reporting model by which financial and non-
financial information is reported as a single package. Different media of communication 
may be used including paper, internet, forums, panels and official launches. 
 
A more holistic view of the information relevant to the company and its value proposition 
and strategy is viewed as the primary benefit of integrated reporting. But there are also 
several secondary benefits of integrated reporting to the company, its stakeholders as well 
as to society as a whole. The disadvantages of the traditional reporting system and the 
benefits of integrated reporting form the business case for adopting integrated reporting. 
Many listed companies especially in the developed countries are adopting integrated 
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reporting, however, the actual rate of adoption of integrated reporting is not known. The 
implementation of integrated reporting is regarded as a change management process, 
dealing on the one hand, with organisational issues including, developing a business 
strategy, setting up performance targets and performance indicators, identification of 
performance drivers, the resources required as well as the risks involved, setting up a 
multidisciplinary committee to drive it, promoting support of top management, setting up 
of communication channels with stakeholders, setting up a system to capture data and 
monitor performance, setting up quality assurances processes and planning the reporting 
process. 
 
The implementation process also involves, data capturing issues such as ensuring that the 
right data is captured at the right time using correct metrics, and the reporting issues 
including ensuring that the report is compiled and structured in accordance with the 
provisions of the Discussion Paper and the reporting strategies. Several initiatives have 
evolved globally in promoting integrated reporting, including the King III Code of South 
Africa, the IRC of South Africa, the International Integrated Reporting Committee 
(IIRC), and Global Reporting Initiate (GRI) as well as the Prince of Wales Accounting 
for Sustainability project. Individual countries such as South Africa, Denmark and the 
UK have also played a regulatory role in promoting integrated reporting. The role of 
these initiatives have taken different forms, some are regulatory, other have developed 
frameworks, principles and codes, while others have focused on assurance.  
 
In the Southern African region, South Africa has been leading the way in integrated 
reporting. The King III code requires listed companies to issue integrated reports. In 2011 
the IRC of South Africa was formed. Immediately after its formation it issued a 
Discussion Paper on Integrated Reporting. The Discussion Paper provides guidance to 
listed companies on how to approach integrated reporting. However, the discussion paper 
does not address integrated management issues. Although the efforts by JSE listed 
companies in adopting integrated reporting is remarkably encouraging, but the assurance 
of integrated reports remains relatively slow. However, for the rest of the region, 
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particularly Botswana, there is no information about the state of Integrated Reporting or 
of its quality relative to that in South Africa. 
 
With globalisation, comparative corporate disclosure is a means of benchmarking 
disclosure regimes against others with a view to improving the quality of disclosure. Yet 
no comparative study of corporate disclosure involving Botswana or South African listed 
companies has ever been conducted. As discussed in chapter one this state of affairs 
warrants this study. Since integrated reporting is now the primary form of corporate 
disclosure this study accordingly involves a comparative integrated disclosure of 
Botswana and South African listed companies. In particular it explores whether the 
difference in the state of integrated reporting is attributable to integrated management 
system factors or to integrated reporting process factors or to both sets of factors. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter one discussed corporate disclosure and explained why it is a recurring theme. It 
also presented the research problem and the research questions that must be answered to 
solve it. Then mandatory disclosure and contextual disclosure were discussed in chapters 
two and three respectively. In each case the underlying theories, the developments and 
shortcomings of each form of disclosure were highlighted. On the other hand, chapter 
four examined integrated reporting, a new form of corporate disclosure which attempts to 
address the shortcomings of traditional reporting. 
 
As stated in chapter one the objective of this study is to benchmark the quality of 
corporate disclosure of Botswana listed companies against that of South African listed 
companies. The corresponding research question is: is there any difference in quality of 
corporate disclosure between Botswana listed companies and that of South African listed 
companies? This chapter discusses how the research objectives were achieved. 
 
Specifically, the chapter documents the populations and samples studied, the research 
instrument used and the collection and analysis of data. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised into six sections namely: the research instrument, research methodology, 
populations and samples studied, data collection, data analysis and ethical issues. A 
summary concludes the chapter. 
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5.2 THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
5.2.1 The corporate disclosure checklist 
 
A checklist is defined as a list of behaviours, characteristics, skills or other items that a 
researcher is interested in investigating (Metler, 2012; Leedy &Ormrod, 2001:197). 
Benchmarking the quality of corporate disclosure of companies in one market against that 
of companies in another market requires measuring and comparing the quality of 
disclosure of Botswana and South African companies. A checklist is regarded as an 
appropriate instrument for achieving the research objective in this study. In this context a 
checklist is a list of especially set questions, the responses to which indicate the quality of 
disclosure. 
 
According to Mertler (2012:141) checklists are different from rating scales in that unlike 
rating scales which present a continuum of responses to the question, checklists permit 
only a dichotomous set of responses; as such, checklists present data that is not as neatly 
detailed as those presented by rating scales. Despite this shortcoming, this study uses a 
checklist because it is quicker and cheaper to use than the rating scale method. 
Furthermore, a checklist conveniently matches the content analysis method used in this 
study. 
 
Checklists may be constructed, adapted or adopted; and each approach has its advantages 
and disadvantages. Corporate disclosure checklists are developed from standards, codes, 
legal provisions, rules and good disclosure practices that set acceptable quality of 
corporate disclosure. The checklist questions for this study cover four areas of corporate 
disclosure, discussed in chapters two through to four: mandatory disclosure, corporate 
governance disclosure, sustainability reporting and integrated reporting. 
 
5.2.2 Checklist questions on mandatory disclosure 
 
As discussed in chapter two, mandatory disclosure takes the form of published financial 
statements and notes thereto that are prepared in compliance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards/International Accounting Standards, Legal codes and Stock 
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Exchange Regulations. Furthermore, the reliability and hence the usefulness of 
mandatory disclosure is verified by independent auditors. Checklist questions on 
mandatory disclosure in this study cover financial information, independent auditors’ 
opinion, and going concern status – the traditional mandatory disclosure items. However, 
given the modern trend of classifying corporate information into financial and non-
financial categories some additional financial information that is disclosed voluntarily is 
included in this under this section of the checklist as well. The checklist questions used in 
this study appear in section 1 of the Corporate Disclosure Checklist appearing in 
Appendix A. 
 
5.2.3 Checklist questions on corporate governance disclosure 
 
King III requires companies to disclosure specific corporate governance items or explain 
their non-disclosure. Checklist questions for this study covered seven key corporate 
governance areas: Ethical leadership, Board of directors, Internal audit, Audit Committee, 
Compliance with laws, Governance of IT and Governance of risks. These areas are 
further broken down into specific questions as shown in section 2 of the Checklist in 
Appendix A. 
 
5.2.4 Checklist questions on sustainability reporting 
 
The disclosure of sustainability performance is governed by standards issued by GRI and 
King III and covers five main areas: company profile, sustainability report format, 
forward-looking information, social responsibility disclosure, environmental disclosure 
and stakeholder relationship. These areas are further broken down into different themes 
including economic issues, business strategy, management approach, labour practices and 
environmental issues. It also covers human rights and social issues as well as the 
company’s product responsibility. This study has adopted the King III disclosure 
checklist (Ernst & Young, 2009)and GRI guidelines because of their availability and 
comprehensiveness. Section 3 of the Corporate Disclosure checklist given in Appendix A 
shows the checklist questions relating to sustainability. 
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5.2.5 Checklist questions on integrated reporting 
 
As discussed in chapter four, integrated reporting has emerged to become the primary 
form of corporate disclosure. Although there are no integrated reporting standards as yet, 
the IRC and the International Integrated Reporting Committee have developed 
frameworks and guidelines which have been used to construct a disclosure checklist on 
integrated reporting. However, as integrated reporting is not yet practiced in the BSE 
companies during the period covered by this study its assessment relates to the JSE 
companies and seeks to establish the overall level and trend of integrated reporting over 
the period covered by this study.  
 
The assessment also examines the structure of integrated reporting whether it is one 
report or a set of separate but linked economic, governance and sustainability reports; and 
to establish the extent of the board’s involvement in integrated reporting. Section 4 of the 
checklist in appendix A contains questions on integrated reporting. 
 
5.2.6 Instrument reliability and validity 
 
According to De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport, (2012:171) a data collection 
instrument should have the quality of reliability and validity to yield credible findings. 
Accordingly, although the research instrument in this study has been adapted from King 
III disclosure checklist (Ernst & Young, 2009) and GRI guidelines, its reliability and 
validity has been carefully considered. 
 
The reliability of a research instrument concerns the extent to which the instrument 
consistently yields the same results. This feature has been embedded in the instrument 
through piloting the instrument, and having the instrument scored by an expert in the 
field of corporate disclosure. On the other hand validity has been defined as the degree to 
which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure (in this case the quality of 
corporate disclosure) (Babbie, 2007:146). De Vos et al (2012:173) identify three aspects 
of validity: content validity, construct validity and criteria validity. 
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Content validity indicates the extent to which the instrument adequately covers the area 
studied. As the questions in the instrument have been adapted from checklists developed 
by professional bodies and experts in the field, it can be argued that the instrument 
possesses content validity. 
 
An instrument is said to have construct validity if it measures that which cannot be 
directly observed. In this study the construct measured is the quality of corporate 
disclosure and a ‘yes’ response to the questions in the instrument indicates that the 
quality of disclosure is good, and vice versa. Furthermore, as the questions in the 
instrument have been adapted from checklists developed and tested by experts in the 
field, it can also be argued that the questions adequately define the construct measure that 
is the quality of corporate disclosure. 
 
Criteria validity shows the extent to which the scores of an instrument correlate with 
those of another external and independent instrument known or believed to measure the 
same concept studied. As De Vos et al (2012:174) document valid and reliable criteria 
may not exist or may be difficult to test; this has been the case in this study, no valid and 
reliable criteria to test the instrument against were found. 
 
5.3 DATA COLLECTION 
5.3.1 Analysis of corporate annual reports 
 
To collect data on the quality of corporate disclosure of companies listed on the Domestic 
Board of the BSE the following steps were followed: 
• The annual reports for the calendar years 2010 and 2011 of 23 companies listed on 
the exchange’s domestic board were collected from the companies. 
• The content of each annual report was analysed. 
• The relevant sections of each annual report were reviewed according to the key 
questions as per the checklist and then analysed in accordance with the criteria set 
out under 5.3.2 below. 
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• The data on the scored checklists for all the companies was summarised, and entered 
into the Excel spreadsheet software and analysed as explained under 5.6 below. 
• The results of the analysis are discussed and presented using tables and graphs as 
discussed in chapter 6. 
 
For the top 40 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the following steps 
were followed: 
• The top 40 JSE listed companies in 2010 and 2011 were identified using the FTSE 
rating agency. 
• The 2010 and 2011 annual reports of the top 40 JSE listed companies were 
downloaded from their websites. 
• The contents of each annual report was analysed by identifying the relevant sections 
in the annual report which report on the relevant issues raised in the corporate 
disclosure checklist. 
• The relevant sections of the annual reports were assessed using the applicable 
questions in the corporate disclosure checklist. 
• The checklist instrument was scored for each applicable disclosure in the relevant 
section analysed in accordance with the criteria set out under 5.3.2 below. 
• The data on the checklist of each company was summarised on the disclosure data 
sheet, then entered into the Excel spreadsheet software and analysed as explained 
under 5.6 below. 
• The results from the analysis are discussed and presented using graphs and tables as 
shown in chapter six. 
 
5.3.2 Scoring the quality of disclosure on the checklist 
 
The corporate disclosure checklist captures the quality of disclosure as assessed by the 
content analyst. The following quality assessment criteria have been used: 
• If an item of information is either not disclosed at all or its disclosure lacks 
sufficiency or its nondisclosure is not justified the item is scored as No(N) 
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• If a piece of information is disclosed properly in the relevant sections of the annual 
report with sufficient details or its nondisclosure is justified the item is scored as Yes 
(Y). 
• If the question is not applicable to the item, the item is not scored at all. 
 
5.4 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Two research methods are used in this study, namely literature review and content 
analysis. Literature review is an important method of research usually applied at the early 
stages of the study for a number of reasons including the following stated by Mouton 
(2007:35): 
• To ensure that one does not duplicate a previous study; 
• To discover the most recent and authoritative theorising about the subject; 
• To find out the most widely accepted empirical findings in the fields of study; 
• To identify the available instrumentation that has proven validity and reliability; 
• To ascertain the most widely accepted definitions of key concepts in the fields; 
• To ensure that authoritative use is made of relevant textbooks, articles, theses and 
dissertations. 
 
Literature review is in this study used for all the above reasons. Additionally, it is used as 
a method of reflecting on what other studies covered on the topic under study, with a 
view to identifying gaps which could be filled by this study. In chapter two for example, 
literature review reveals an unknown but improving level of corporate disclosure; while 
chapters two and three review the major theories underlying corporate disclosure. In this 
chapter literature review is used to identify research methods and instruments that worked 
well in previous studies and which could be applied in this study. 
 
Content analysis on the other hand, is used in the final stages of this study to search for 
answers to the research questions posed in this study.  Content analysis is described as a 
critical study of recorded human communication, undertaken to make valid inferences 
about some social phenomena (Cronje, 2008:140 citing Mouton, 2005:165). 
71 
 
 
Babbie (2007:330) gives the following advantages and disadvantages of content analysis: 
Advantages: 
• Economy in terms of money and time. This is regarded as probably the greatest 
advantage of content analysis. 
• Allows the correction of errors. If one discovered that a mistake has been made in 
carrying out an experiment or a survey, the experiment can be redone. This is not 
possible with other methods of research. 
• Permits the study of the process occurring over a long period of time. 
• It has the advantage of all unobtrusive measures in that content analysis seldom has 
any effect on the subject being studied. 
• Disadvantages 
• It is limited to the examination of recorded communications. 
• Validity problems are likely to arise unless what is being studied is communications 
per se. 
 
According to Babbie (2007:320) some topics such as the study of communication are 
more appropriately addressed by content analysis than by any other method of enquiry. 
Mouton (2001:166) also contends that when research involves large volumes of text 
content analysis should be used. Accordingly, because this study involves analysis of 
company annual reports, content analysis is regarded as the best method to use. 
 
5.5 POPULATION AND THE SAMPLES STUDIED 
 
In Botswana the study focuses on a population comprising 23 companies that are listed 
on the BSE’s Domestic Equity Board during the calendar years 2010 and 2011. 
Companies listed on the exchange’s Foreign Equity Board have been deliberately 
excluded from the study to avoid the potential influence they might have on the overall 
quality of financial reporting and disclosure. It is assumed that foreign companies are 
better than domestic companies in terms of financial reporting and disclosure skills. The 
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unit of analysis is the medium through which companies communicate their financial 
performance and governance to their stakeholders, namely the corporate annual report. 
To permit an industry by industry assessment of the quality of disclosure the companies 
were classified by sectors as follows: 
 
Table 5.1 Classification of BSE companies by industry 
Sector Company 
  
Financial services Barclays Bank Botswana Ltd 
 African Banking Corporation (ABC) 
 First National Bank (FNB) 
 Standard Chartered (STANCHART) 
 Letshego Holdings Ltd 
 Imara Corporation 
 Botswana Insurance Holding Corporation 
 RDC Ltd 
 Turnstar Ltd 
 Prime Time Property Holdings Ltd 
 Letlole Ltd 
 NAP Ltd 
Consumer services Olympia Corporation Ltd 
 Furniture Mart Ltd 
 Sefalana Cash & Carry Ltd 
 Sefalana Ltd 
 G4 Security Services 
 RPC Data Ltd 
 Chobe Ltd 
 Cresta Ltd 
 Wilderness Ltd 
 FGS Ltd 
Consumer goods Sechaba Breweries Ltd 
Healthcare Medical Rescue Ltd 
 
 Source: BSE  
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Table 5.2: Classification of the top 40 JSE listed companies 
 
 
 Source: JSE 
Sector Company 
Basic  materials Anglo American Plc 
 Anglo American Platinum  Ltd 
 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 
 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 
 BHP Billiton Plc 
 Gold Fields Ltd 
 Harmony GM Co Ltd 
 Impala Platinum Hldgs Ltd 
 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 
 ExxaroResourcesLtd 
 Lonmin Plc 
 Mondi Plc 
 Assore Ltd 
Financial services ABSA Group Ltd 
 Growthpoint Prop Ltd 
 Capital Shop Cent Grp Plc 
 African Bank Inv Ltd 
 Nedbank Group Ltd 
 Standard Bank Group Ltd 
 FirstRand Ltd 
 Old Mutual Plc 
 Sanlam Limited 
 RMB Holdings Ltd 
 Investec Ltd 
 Investec Plc 
Industrials Remgro Ltd 
 Bidvest Ltd 
Telecommunication MTN Group Ltd 
 Vodacom Group Ltd 
Healthcare Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd 
Consumer goods Tiger Brands Ltd 
 Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd 
 Compagnie Fin Richemont 
 SABMiller Plc 
Consumer services Shoprite Holdings Ltd 
 Truworths International Ltd 
 Naspers Ltd 
 Massmart Holdings Ltd 
 Woolworths Holdings Ltd 
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One decision which previous researchers had to make is whether to include or exclude 
financial companies from the study. Akhtaruddin (2005) and Ahmed (2006) excluded 
financial companies from their samples on the grounds that they were different from non-
financial companies in terms of operations and statues governing their disclosure. On the 
other hand, Barako, Hancok and Izan (2006:15) did not exclude financial companies in 
their study. In this study financial companies have been included because the objective is 
to come up with an overall quality of corporate disclosure of companies listed on each 
stock exchange as well as of the different industries in which companies studied fall. 
However, the data collection instrument has been designed to take into account the 
special operations, statues and disclosure requirements of different companies. 
 
5.6 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
The captured data was made ready for analysis by transferring it from the checklist to the 
excel spreadsheet where it was presented in a cross tabulation format with columns 
representing companies and rows representing type of corporate information. Then the 
data was analysed in two stages, at the first stage the quality of disclosure is calculated as 
a proportion of properly disclosed items to the total items disclosable. This analysis is 
done for the entire sample and shows the quality disclosure for the sample, each category 
of disclosure, each area of disclosure as well as for each sector of disclosure. For ease of 
interpretation the results of the analysis are presented graphically and in a tabular form. 
This procedure is followed for each sample. 
 
The second stage of analysis, is a comparative analysis of disclosure involving  
comparing each level of corporate disclosure calculated in stage one for each sample of 
companies with the corresponding level of corporate disclosure of the companies in the 
other sample, and presenting the results graphically and in tables. 
 
At the time this study was conducted, Integrated Reporting had not yet been introduced in 
Botswana. Consequently, the comparative analysis does not cover Integrated Reporting. 
However, a comparative analysis of Integrated Reporting of South African companies 
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over the period covered by this study has been performed to explore if there are lessons to 
learn from their experience. 
 
5.7 ETHICAL ISSUES 
 
The data for this study has been collected from the companies’ annual reports which are 
published and thus freely available on the internet as well as from the companies’ head 
offices. There were thus no ethical issues to consider during the collection of data except 
for the formal requests made to obtain the lists of listed companies; and the 
acknowledgement of all sources used in this study. 
 
5.8 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter explains the research process followed to benchmark the level of corporate 
disclosure of listed companies in Botswana against those of South Africa. The process 
involved reviewing the literature, constructing a research instrument, selecting the 
samples of companies to study and conducting content analysis on the companies’ annual 
reports to assess the quality of corporate disclosure for each selected item. Furthermore, 
the process involved tabulating the data and then analysing it to establish the quality of 
corporate disclosure.   
 
The research instrument used in this study is the developed corporate disclosure 
checklist. This is basically a list of questions designed to assess the level of mandatory 
disclosure, corporate governance, sustainability disclosure and integrated reporting. The 
responses to checklist questions indicate whether the level of disclosure is high or low.  
 
Two research methods are used in this study; literature review and content analysis. 
Literature review is a critical study of existing literature on the topic undertaken in order 
to avoid duplicating previous studies, to discover the most recent and authoritative 
theorising about the topic, to identify available instrumentation that have proven validity 
and reliability; to ensure that authoritative use is made of relevant textbooks, articles and 
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dissertations and to identify the research gaps that can be filled by the current study. 
According to existing literature no comparative study on the level of corporate disclosure 
between South Africa and Botswana exists; and this is a further justification of this study. 
 
The data for this study was drawn from two populations of companies: (i) companies 
listed on the Domestic Equity Board of the BSE and (ii) companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. All 23 companies listed on the Domestic Board of the 
BSE are studied while only the top 40 companies listed on the JSE are studied. The top 
40 companies listed on the JSE are included in the sample studied in order to check how 
the disclosure quality of Botswana companies compares with the best companies on the 
JSE. The unit of study is the annual report of a company for the periods ending in the 
calendar years 2010 and 2011. The annual reports of BSE listed companies have been 
selected from the companies’ head offices while those of the JSE listed companies were 
downloaded from their respective websites. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter four of this dissertation discussed how content analysis, the disclosure checklist 
and the Excel spreadsheet program were to be used to capture, code, process and analyse 
data in order to assess the level of corporate disclosure in the annual reports of samples of 
companies listed on the BSE and JSE for the years ended 31 December 2010 and 2011. 
The chapter also identified three major categories of corporate disclosure to be assessed 
namely: Overall corporate disclosure, mandatory disclosure, disclosure of sustainability 
performance, corporate governance disclosure and integrated reporting. A description of 
how the assessment process would be carried out was also given. 
 
This chapter discusses the findings of the study starting with the quality of corporate 
disclosure of companies listed on the BSE, followed by the quality of corporate 
disclosure of the top 40 JSE listed companies and ending with a comparative analysis of 
the quality of corporate disclosure of the companies from the two exchanges. In each case 
the discussion of the findings is presented under five categories of disclosure: Overall 
corporate disclosure, mandatory disclosure, corporate governance disclosure and 
sustainability performance. For each of these disclosure categories a sector analysis of the 
level of disclosure is also shown in order to assess the trend and pattern of corporate 
disclosure in different sectors in which the assessed companies fall. 
 
In presenting the findings, charts and tables are used. Charts are used to show the level of 
corporate disclosure while tables are used to show either the sector-wise distribution of 
the level of disclosure or a detailed analysis of disclosure. For each category of 
disclosure, the discussion of the level of disclosure follows immediately after the relevant 
chart and table. The level of corporate disclosure is expressed in percentages rather than 
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the number of companies possessing a given level of disclosure in order to ensure 
comparability. 
 
6.2 LEVELOF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE IN THE BSE SAMPLE 
6.2.1 Level of overall corporate disclosure in the BSE sample 
 
Figure 6.1: Level of overall corporate disclosure in the BSE sample 
 
Key: Y = Disclosed; N= Not disclosed 
 
Table 6.1: Level of overall corporate disclosure by sector in the BSE sample 
Sector 2010 2011 
 Y % N % Y % N % 
Financials 237 32 513 68 282 37 468 63 
Consumer service 300 40 450 60 304 41 446 59 
Consumer goods 47 63 28 37 49 65 26 35 
Healthcare 26 35 49 65 24 32 51 68 
 
The disclosure checklist had 75 items that each company in the samples studied was 
expected to disclose in its corporate annual report. In the case of the 23 companies listed 
on the Domestic equity board of the BSE 1 725 items were supposed to be disclosed.  
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According to figure 6.1 above, in 2010 37% of the items were disclosed compared to 
40% in 2011. This improvement in the level of overall corporate disclosure is consistent 
with the observation by the IMF/World Bank (2006:20) that corporate reporting practices 
in Botswana improved significantly over the past five years. 
 
Table 6.1 which analyses the quality of overall corporate disclosure by sector, reveals 
four patterns of overall corporate disclosure: the Consumer Goods Sector had a relatively 
high and improving level of corporate disclosure (63% in 2010 and 65% in 2011). The 
Consumer services sector on the other hand had a relatively stable disclosure level of 
40% in 2010 and 41% in 2011; while the Healthcare Sector had a low but improving 
level of disclosure.  
 
6.2.2 Level of disclosure of categories of corporate information in the BSE sample 
 
Figure 6.2: Level of disclosure of categories of corporate information in the BSE 
sample 
 
Key: Y= disclosed; N = Not disclosed 
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Table 6.2: Level of disclosure of categories of information by sector in the BSE 
sample 
Categories of corporate 
information 
Financial 
information 
Corporate 
Governance 
information 
Sustainability 
Information 
Sector 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 
Financial services 59% 59% 25% 25% 31% 31% 
Consumer services 57% 57% 37% 37% 38% 38% 
Consumer goods 71% 71% 68% 68% 52% 52% 
Healthcare 29% 29% 40% 40% 30% 30% 
 
According to Figure 6.2 the level of disclosure of different categories of corporate 
information was generally low over the period covered by the study. Figure 6.2 also 
shows that the information category that had the highest percentage of disclosure over the 
period of study was financial information with 62% of the items disclosed in 2010 and 
57% of the items disclosed in 2011. The sustainability information category followed 
next with a disclosure level of 36% in 2010 and 40% in 2011. A further observation from 
Figure 6.2 is, while the percentage of disclosure of financial information declined that of 
corporate governance and sustainability information increased.  
 
According to Table 6.2 the Consumer Goods Sector had the highest corporate disclosure 
quality for all the corporate information categories studied. Its percentage of disclosed 
financial information items was 71% over the two year period; while that for corporate 
governance and sustainability information stood at 68% and 52% respectively. Table 6.2 
further shows the Consumer Services Sector as the next disclosing sector in ranking. Its 
percentage of disclosed items for each corporate information category was as follows: 
financial information 57% for both years; corporate governance 37% in both years and 
sustainability information 38% for both years. 
 
The table also shows the Financial Services Sector as having corporate disclosure levels 
that falls between the levels of the other sectors. The sector disclosed  59% of financial 
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information in both years ,  25% of corporate governance information in both years  and 
31%  of sustainability information in both years.. 
 
The table further shows the Healthcare Sector as the sector with the lowest level of 
corporate disclosure of all the three information categories. It disclosed 29% of financial 
information, 40% of corporate governance information and 30% of sustainability 
information. 
 
6.2.3 Level of disclosure of financial information in the BSE sample 
 
Figure 6.3: Level of disclosure of financial information in the BSE sample 
 
Key: Y= disclosed, N= not disclosed 
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Table 6.3: Level of disclosure of different items of financial information in the JSE 
sample 
 2010 2011 
Item Y % N % Y % N % 
Favourable auditors’ opinion 20 87 3 13 20 87 3 13 
Financial highlights 21 91 2 9 22 96 1 4 
Going concern status 18 78 5 22 17 74 6 26 
Value added and its distribution 14 61 9 39 7 30 16 70 
Significant financial assistance to or from 
government 
2 9 21 91 2 9 21 91 
Policies, practices and proportion spent 
on local based supplies 
1 4 22 96 1 4 22 96 
 
Financial information was described as corporate information that is disclosed 
mandatorily plus any other financial information that is disclosed voluntarily. According 
to Figure 6.3 the level of disclosure of financial information was 62% while in 2011 the 
percentage of the items disclosed fell to 57%. 
 
Table 6.3 provides a detailed analysis of how companies disclosed the different financial 
information items that make up financial information. According to this table the items 
that were disclosed by most companies in both years were: financial highlights disclosed 
by 91% of the companies and favourable audit opinion, disclosed by 87% of the 
companies. On the other hand value added and its distribution; and policies, practices and 
proportion spent on local based supplies were disclosed by very few companies (9% and 
4%) respectively in both years. 
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6.2.4: Level of disclosure of Corporate Governance information in the BSE sample 
 
Figure 6.4: Level of disclosure of corporate governance reporting in the BSE 
sample 
 
Key: Y disclosed, N not disclosed 
 
Table 6.4: Level of disclosure of corporate governance reporting in the BSE 
sample 
 2010 2011 
Item Y % N % Y % N % 
Ethical leadership 16 35 30 65 18 39 28 61 
Board of Directors 65 40 96 60 64 40 97 60 
Internal Audit 18 39 28 61 21 46 25 54 
Audit Committee 88 48 96 52 96 52 88 48 
Compliance with laws 25 36 44 64 28 41 41 59 
Governance of IT 0 0 115 100 0 0 115 100 
Governance of risks 51 28 133 72 69 38 115 62 
 
The percentage of corporate governance information disclosed in 2010 was 33% 
compared to 37% in 2011. In spite of a slight improvement, the level of disclosure 
remained relatively low. Table 6.4 shows that almost all corporate governance items had 
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a percentage of disclosure of less than 50%. The only exception was the disclosure 
relating to the Audit Committee which increased from 48% in 2010 to 52% in 2011. 
Table 6.4 further shows two items that are poorly disclosed as governance of IT which 
was not disclosed at all in both years and governance of risks 72% in 2010; declining to 
62% in 2011. 
 
6.2.5 Level of disclosure of sustainability performance in the BSE sample 
 
Figure 6.5: Level of disclosure of sustainability reporting in the BSE sample 
 
 Key: Y = disclosed, N= not disclosed 
 
Table 6.5: Level of disclosure of sustainability reporting in the BSE sample 
 2010 2011 
Item Y % N % Y % N % 
Company profile 207 100 0 0 207 100 0 0 
Report format 7 15 39 85 10 22 36 78 
Forward-looking information 25 22 90 78 25 22 90 78 
Social impact 24 13 160 87 41 22 143 78 
Environmental impact 11 8 127 92 10 7 128 93 
Stakeholders relationship 0 0 69 100 4 6 65 94 
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The percentage of disclosed items was 36% in 2010 compared to 39% in 2011. In spite of a 
slight improvement, the level of disclosure was generally low over the two year period. 
According to Table 6.5 the company profile was fully disclosed by all companies over the 
period, but the level of disclosure of the rest of the items was generally low. Among the poorly 
disclosed items were; stakeholder relationships with a 0% disclosure level in 2010 which 
improved slightly to 6% in 2011. The other one was environmental impact disclosed by 8% of 
the companies in 2011 but by 7% in 2011. 
 
6.3 LEVEL OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE IN THE JSE SAMPLE 
 
6.3.1 Level of overall corporate disclosure in the JSE sample 
Figure 6.6: Level of overall corporate disclosure in the JSE sample 
 
Key: Y = disclosed; N= not disclosed 
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Table 6.6: Level of overall corporate disclosure by sector in the JSE sample 
 
 
The checklist had 75 corporation information items to asses for each of the top 40 
companies listed on the JSE during 2010 and 2011. In total there were 3000 corporate 
information items to be assessed in each of the years covered by the study. According to 
Figure 6.6 in 2010 74% of the corporate information items were disclosed compared to 
79% in 2011. Thus, the quality of overall corporate disclosure increased by five percent. 
 
A further analysis of the overall quality of corporate disclosure by sector in Table 6.6 
reveals three best disclosing sectors: Healthcare disclosing 91% of the corporate 
information in 2010 and 99% of the items in 2011; and the Telecommunication Sector, 
disclosing 91% of the corporate information items in 2010 and 95% of the items in 2011. 
 
Table 6.6 further shows an overall increase in the level of overall corporate disclosure 
across the sector. The sectors that recorded the highest increase in the level of overall 
corporate disclosure were healthcare and consumer services each recording an 8 percent 
increase. The basic materials, financial services and the Telecommunications Sectors 
came next with a 5% and 4% increase in the level of corporate disclosure respectively. 
The remaining sectors had an increase of between 0% and 3%. 
 
6.3.2 Level of disclosure of categories of corporate information in the JSE sample 
 
Sector 2010 2011 
Item Y % N % Y % N % 
Basic materials 740 76 235 24 794 81 181 19 
Financial services 639 71 261 29 676 75 224 25 
Consumer services 148 66 77 34 167 74 58 26 
Consumer goods 314 70 136 30 324 72 126 28 
Healthcare 68 91 7 9 74 99 1 1 
Industrials 113 75 37 25 117 78 33 22 
Telecommunications 137 91 13 9 143 95 7 5 
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Figure 6.7: Level of disclosure of categories of corporate information in the JSE 
sample. 
 
 Key: Y= disclosed; N= not disclosed 
 
Table 6.7: Level of disclosure of categories of information by sector in the JSE 
sample. 
Categories of corporate 
information 
Financial 
information 
Corporate 
governance 
information 
Sustainability 
information 
Sector 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 
Basic materials 79 79 75 83 77 81 
Financial services 75 82 77 79 63 79 
Consumer services 76 76 49 58 82 91 
Consumer goods 86 91 83 83 73 77 
Healthcare 100 100 86 100 93 97 
Industrials 86 93 86 93 62 59 
Telecommunications  86 86 89 100 95 92 
 
According to Figure 6.7 the percentage of disclosure of the three categories of 
information categories was generally high. However the financial information category 
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had the highest percentage of disclosure followed by corporate governance and 
sustainability information. Furthermore each category of information experienced a slight 
increase in the percentage of disclosure. 
 
Table 6.7 reveals the pattern and trend of disclosure across eight sectors. Overall all 
sectors had a high percentage of disclosure but some sectors performed much better than 
others. The Telecommunications Sector had the best disclosure of all the three 
information categories, in 2010 its disclosure of corporate information stood at 100%. 
Another sector that had the best disclosure of all the three information categories was the 
Healthcare Sector. Its percentage of disclosed financial information and corporate 
governance reached 100% over the two year period. The table also shows the Consumer 
Services Sector as the only one that had the lowest percentage of disclosure of corporate 
governance information over the two year period. 
 
6.3.3 Disclosure of financial information in the JSE sample 
 
Figure 6.8: Level of disclosure of financial information in the JSE sample 
 
 
Key: Y= disclosed; N= not disclosed.  
 
Table 6.8: Level of disclosure of different items of financial information in the JSE 
sample 
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 2010 2011 
Item Y % N % Y % N % 
Favourable auditors’ opinion 40 100 0 0 40 100 0 0 
Financial highlights 40 100 0 0 40 100 0 0 
Going concern status 40 100 0 0 40 100 0 0 
Value added and its distribution 31 77 9 23 29 73 11 27 
Significant financial assistance to or 
from government 
12 30 28 70 17 42 23 58 
Policies, practices and proportion spent 
on local based supplies 
20 50 20 50 27 68 13 32 
 
According to figure 6.8 above, the level of disclosure of financial information was 70% 
in 2010 and 80% in 2011.There was thus a slight improvement in 2011. An analysis of 
disclosure of different financial information items shows three items which had a low 
disclosure percentage in both years. The items were significant financial assistance to or 
from government; policies practices and proportion spent on local based suppliers. The 
rest of the items were fully disclosed. 
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6.3.4 JSE Disclosure of corporate governance in the JSE sample. 
 
Figure 6.9: Level of disclosure of corporate governance in the JSE sample 
 
Key: Y= disclosed; N=not disclosed. 
 
Table 6.9: Level of disclosure of corporate governance in the JSE sample 
 2010 2011 
 
Y % N % Y % N % 
Ethical leadership 79 99 1 1 74 93 6 7 
Board of directors 247 88 33 12 250 89 30 11 
Internal audit 64 80 16 20 66 83 14 17 
Audit Committee 241 75 79 25 277 87 43 13 
Compliance with laws 106 88 14 12 109 91 11 9 
Governance of IT 56 28 144 72 68 34 132 66 
Governance of risks 257 80 63 20 278 87 42 13 
 
Figure 6.9 shows the disclosure of Corporate governance at 80% in 2010 and slightly 
higher in 2011. Although according to Table 6.9 in 2010 each corporate governance item 
had its own level of disclosure, the level of disclosure was high for most items. The 
corporate governance item that had the highest percentage of disclosure was ethical 
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leadership 99%, board of directors 88%, compliance with laws 88%, internal audit 80%, 
governance of risks 80%; while Audit Committee had 75%. The item that had the lowest 
percentage of disclosure was governance of IT at 28%.  
 
Further to the above,Table 6.9 shows an increase in all corporate governance  information 
items except ethical leadership which decreased from 99% in 2010 to 93% in 2011. 
6.3.5 Level of disclosure of sustainability performance in the JSE sample 
 
Figure 6.10: Level of disclosure of sustainability performance in the JSE sample 
 
Key: Y= disclosed; N = not disclosed 
 
Table 6.10: Level of disclosure of sustainability performance in the JSE sample 
 2010 2011 
Item Y % N % Y % N % 
Company profile 360 100 0 0 360 100 0 0 
Report format 39 49 41 51 32 40 48 60 
Forward-looking information 149 75 51 25 158 79 42 21 
Social impact 213 67 107 33 226 71 94 29 
Environmental impact 117 49 123 51 139 58 101 42 
Stakeholders relationship 76 63 44 37 93 78 27 22 
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According to Figure 6.10 the percentage of disclosure of sustainability information was 
68% in 2010 and 70% in 2011. Table 6.10 reveals company profile as the fully disclosed 
sustainability information item in both years. This was followed by Forward-looking 
information with a percentage of disclosure of 75% in 2010 and 79% in 2011. Social 
impact had 67% in 2010 and 71% in 2011 while stakeholder relationships had 63% in 
2010 and 78% in 2011. The item that had the lowest percentage of disclosure was the 
report format with 49% in 2010 and 40% in 2011. 
 
6.4 COMPARATIVE LEVELS OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
6.4.1 Comparative levels of overall corporate disclosure 
 
Figure 6.11: Comparative levels of overall corporate disclosure 
 
Key: Y= disclosed; N= not disclosed 
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Table 6.11: Comparative levels of overall corporate disclosure by sector 
 2010 2011 
Item BSE JSE BSE JSE 
Basic materials - 76 - 81 
Financial services 32 71 37 75 
Consumer services 40 66 41 74 
Consumer goods 63 70 65 72 
Healthcare 35 91 52 99 
Industrials - 75 - 78 
Telecommunications  - 91 - 95 
 
From Figure 6.11 JSE companies had a higher percentage of disclosure than the BSE 
companies and the difference was quite significant. Furthermore, both samples of 
companies experienced a slight decrease in the overall level of disclosure in 2011. 
 
According to Table 6.11 all JSE sectors had a higher percentage of overall corporate 
disclosure than the BSE companies in both years and the JSE sectors experienced a 
higher increase in the level of overall disclosure than the BSE companies. 
6.4.2 Comparative disclosure of different information categories 
 
Figure 6.12: Comparative levels of disclosure of different information categories 
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Table 6.12: Comparative levels of disclosure of categories of information by sector 
 2010 2011 
 BSE JSE BSE JSE 
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Sector             
Basic materials - - - 79 75 77 - - - 75 83 80 
Financial services 57 25 33 75 77 63 59 35 36 82 79 71 
Consumer goods 86 69 52 83 70 66 71 71 58 93 71 69 
Consumer services 66 37 38 76 49 82 57 37 41 76 58 91 
Healthcare 29 40 30 100 86 94 29 34 42 100 100 97 
Industrials - - - 86 62 62 - - - 93 86 59 
Telecommunications - - - 86 95 95 - - - 86 100 92 
 
According to Figure 6.12 the companies in the JSE sample had a higher disclosure of 
different categories of corporate information than those in the BSE sample in both years. 
Furthermore although there was an increase in the level of corporate disclosure of each 
category of corporate information over the two year period in both samples, the increase 
in the level of corporate disclosure in the JSE companies was much higher than that in the 
BSE companies. 
 
A sector wise comparative analysis of the disclosure of different categories of corporate 
information in Table 6.12 shows three sectors in the JSE sample for which there are no 
corresponding sectors in the BSE sample. The level of disclosure of different categories 
of corporate information in these sectors cannot be compared to the similar sectors in the 
BSE sample. Nevertheless the level of disclosure of different categories of corporate 
information in these sectors was quite high in both years. 
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As for the JSE sectors that had corresponding sectors in the BSE sample Table 6.12 
shows that they had a much higher corporate disclosure of different categories of 
corporate information than the BSE sectors. In some cases the difference was very 
significant. A case in point being the Healthcare Sector, which had the lowest level of 
disclosure in the BSE sample in both years but the highest level of corporate disclosure in 
the JSE sample in both years. 
6.4.3 Comparative levels of disclosure of financial information 
 
Figure 6.13: Comparative levels of disclosure of financial information 
 
 
Table 6.13 (a): Comparative levels of disclosure of financial information by sector 
 2010 2011 
Sector BSE JSE BSE JSE 
Basic materials - 79 - 79 
Financial services 57 75 59 82 
Industrials - 86 - 94 
Telecommunications - 86 - 86 
Healthcare 29 100 29 100 
Consumer goods 86 83 71 93 
Consumer services 66 76 57 76 
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Table 6.13(b): Comparative levels of disclosure of financial information by items 
 2010 2011 
Financial information items BSE JSE BSE JSE 
Favourable auditors’ opinion 87 100 87 100 
Financial highlights 91 100 96 100 
Going concern status 78 100 74 100 
Value added and its distribution 61 77 30 73 
Significant financial assistance to or from government 9 30 9 42 
Policies, practices and proportion spent on local based 
supplies 
4 50 4 68 
 
According to Figure 6.13 companies in the JSE sample had a higher disclosure of 
financial information than companies in the BSE sample in both years. Furthermore 
Figure 6.13 shows that while the level of disclosure in the JSE sample increased slightly 
over the two year period that of the BSE sample decreased slightly during the same 
period. 
 
A sector analysis of comparative disclosure of financial information in Table 6.13(a) 
shows the JSE sectors outperforming the BSE sectors in both years; the only exception 
being the Consumer Goods Sector showed a higher level of disclosure by the BSE sample 
than the JSE sample in 2010. Further to the above, Table 6.13 (a) show on one hand, the 
Healthcare Sector as the best disclosing sector in the JSE sample, and on the other hand 
as the worst disclosing sector of the BSE sample in both years. 
 
A further analysis of disclosure of comparative financial information by items in Table 
6.13(b) shows financial statements as  an item that was fully disclosed by companies in 
both samples; and favourable auditors’ report, financial highlights and going concern 
status as among the highly disclosed items by companies in both samples. On the other 
hand two items were poorly disclosed by companies in both samples in both years: 
Significant contribution to and from government, policies, practices and proportion spent 
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on local based supplies. Value added and its distribution was the only item that had the 
same level of disclosure in both samples in both years. 
6.4.4  Comparative levels of disclosure of corporate governance 
 
Figure 6.14:Comparative levels of disclosure of corporate governance 
 
 
Table 6.14 (a): Comparative levels of disclosure of corporate governance by sector 
 2010 2011 
Sector BSE JSE BSE JSE 
Basic materials - 75 - 83 
Financial services 25 77 35 79 
Industrials - 86 - 86 
Telecommunications - 89 - 100 
Healthcare 40 86 34 100 
Consumer goods 69 70 71 71 
Consumer services 37 49 37 58 
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Table 6.14 (b): Comparative levels of disclosure of corporate governance by items 
 2010 2011 
Item BSE JSE BSE JSE 
Ethical leadership 35 99 39 93 
Board of directors 40 88 40 89 
Internal audit 39 80 46 83 
Audit committee 48 75 52 87 
Compliance with laws 36 88 41 91 
Governance of IT 0 28 0 34 
Governance of risks 28 80 38 87 
 
As per Figure 6.14 the level of disclosure of corporate governance of the JSE companies 
was higher than that of the BSE companies in both years. Furthermore Figure 6.14 shows 
three JSE sectors which had no corresponding sectors in the BSE. These were: the Basic 
Material, Industrial and Telecommunications Sectors; and their levels of corporate 
governance disclosure were high. Otherwise, all the JSE sectors that had corresponding 
sectors on the BSE had higher levels of corporate governance disclosure than the BSE 
sectors. Another revelation from Table 6.14 is that all JSE sectors had very low levels of 
corporate governance disclosure. Further to the above Table 6.14 shows that while the 
level of corporate governance disclosure of BSE companies remained unchanged in both 
years that of JSE companies increased over the period. 
 
According to Table 6.14(b), which shows a comparative disclosure by corporate 
governance items; the companies in both exchanges had a very low level of disclosure of 
governance of information technology (IT).Table 6.14(b) also shows that the BSE 
companies had the lowest level of disclosure for all corporate governance items; but the 
JSE companies showed a much higher disclosure of all the corporate governance items 
except the governance of IT. 
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6.4.5 Comparative levels of disclosure of sustainability performance 
 
Figure 6.15: Comparative levels of disclosure of sustainability performance 
 
 
Table 6.15 (a): Comparative levels of disclosure of sustainability performance by 
sector 
 2010 2011 
Sector BSE JSE BSE JSE 
Basic materials - 77 - 80 
Financial services 33 63 36 71 
Industrials - 62 - 59 
Telecommunications - 96 - 92 
Healthcare 30 94 42 97 
Consumer goods 52 66 58 69 
Consumer services 38 82 41 91 
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Table 6.15 (b): Comparative levels of disclosure of sustainability performance by 
items 
 2010 2011 
Item BSE JSE BSE JSE 
Company profile 100 100 100 100 
Report format 15 49 22 40 
Forward-looking information 22 75 22 79 
Social impact 13 67 22 71 
Environmental impact 8 49 7 58 
Stakeholders relationship 0 63 6 78 
 
According to Figure 6.15 the companies in the JSE sample outperformed companies in 
the BSE sample in disclosing sustainability performance in both years by a wide margin. 
Furthermore, Figure 6.15 shows that although the companies in both samples increased 
their level of disclosure of sustainability performance the companies in the JSE sample 
had a much higher increase. 
 
Table 6.15(a) shows a higher disclosure of sustainability performance within the JSE 
sectors than in the BSE sectors, with the exception of the Industrial Sector which had a 
disclosure of 62% in 2010 and 59% in 2011. According to Table 6.15(b) company profile 
was the only corporate governance item that was disclosed fully by companies in both 
samples in both years. The rest of the items were better disclosed by the JSE sample than 
the BSE sample. The BSE sample had a poor disclosure of all items except company 
profile; and stakeholder relationship was not disclosed at all. The only item that was 
poorly disclosed by the JSE sample in both years was the sustainability report format. 
 
6.5 INTEGRATED REPORTING 
 
As explained in chapter three this is a new form of corporate reporting. As such it was not 
yet practiced in the BSE sample companies during the period covered by this study. 
Accordingly the findings presented below relate to companies in the JSE sample only. 
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6.5.1: Level of integrated reporting in the JSE sample 
 
Figure 6.16: Levels of integrated reporting in the JSE sample 
 
Key: Y= disclosed; N= not disclosed 
 
Table 6.16 (a): Level of integrated reporting in the JSE sample by sector 
 2010 2011 
Sector Y% N% Y% N% 
Basic materials 77 23 92 8 
Financial services 42 58 83 17 
Industrials 50 50 100 0 
Telecommunications 50 50 100 0 
Healthcare 50 50 100 0 
Consumer goods 25 75 75 25 
Consumer services 67 33 100 0 
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Table 6.16 (b): Level of integrated reporting in the JSE sample by specific practices 
 2010 2011 
Aspect of integrated reporting Y% N% Y% N% 
Publication of integrated report 53 47 90 10 
Linked financial, corporate governance and sustainability 
reports 
53 47 88 12 
Report include financial highlights 53 47 88 12 
Board involvement in integrated reporting 53 47 88 12 
 
According to Figure 6.16 all companies in the JSE sample practiced integrated reporting 
but the level of reporting was 52% in 2010. However, by 2011 the level of Integrated 
Reporting was 88%, indicating a significant adoption of this new form of corporate 
reporting. Table 6.16(a) which shows the level of disclosure by sector shows that 
integrated reporting was practiced in almost all sectors in both years. Table 6.16 (a) also 
shows that although the level of Integrated reporting was low in 2010 with the exception 
of the Basic Materials and Consumer Services Sectors; it was quite high in 2011 in all 
sectors. 
 
Table 6.16 (b) shows that while only 53% of the companies disclosed the specific 
integrated reporting aspects in 2010 the percentage of companies disclosing the aspects in 
question increased to around 90% in 2011. This was therefore a significant increase in the 
number of companies reporting corporate information in an integrated manner. Table 
6.16 (b) also shows that the linked integrated report was preferred to the one report 
approach. 
 
6.6 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter discussed the findings of the study in terms of how the data capture was 
tabulated, classified, analysed and presented in percentages, charts and tables with the 
help of the spreadsheet software. The findings are presented for companies in the BSE 
sample, companies in the JSE sample, comparative analysis and integrated reporting. 
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In the case of the companies in the BSE sample, the level of overall corporate disclosure 
was found to be  generally low in both years and varies among the different sectors to 
which companies in the BSE sample fall, for example the ConsumerServices Sector 
topped the list. 
 
Furthermore, of the three major categories of corporate information, the financial 
information category was  the best disclosed category, while the corporate governance 
and sustainability categories are the poorly disclosed. Within the financial information 
category, financial highlights were the most disclosed items, while significant financial 
assistance to and from government and policies, practices and proportion of spending on 
local based supplies are the least disclosed items. The governance of IT and governance 
of risks were the least disclosed items within the corporate governance category while 
within the sustainability performance category the analysis found all the items least 
disclosed. 
 
In the case of companies in the JSE sample the level of overall corporate disclosure was 
found to be  high in both years and in all sectors to which the companies in the sample 
fall. The only exception being the Consumer Services Sector which had a moderate level 
of overall corporate disclosure. Furthermore, almost all corporate information categories 
were highly disclosed and the disclosure levels increased over the period as well as across 
the different sectors to which the information categories belong. However, some of the 
information items within the different information categories, experienced low level of 
disclosure. 
 
Comparatively, companies in the JSE sample had a higher level of corporate disclosure, 
overall, across corresponding sectors as well as within the different information 
categories and items. It was also noted that integrated reporting was practiced by 
companies within the JSE sample and that the percentage of companies practicing IR was 
low in 2010 but significantly high in 2011, although there was still room for 
improvement. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This research was motivated by the IMF/World Bank which in 2006 reported that 
corporate reporting in Botswana has improved over the previous five year period; without 
indicating what the level of corporate disclosure was and how it compares with that of 
other countries. The primary objective of this study was to assess how the level of 
corporate disclosure of companies listed on the BSE compares with that of the top 40 JSE 
listed companies. To address this objective a corporate disclosure checklist was compiled 
based on the King III checklist, GRI principles IFRS, Stock Exchange Regulations and 
the Companies Acts of Botswana and South Africa. 
 
Using content analysis methodology, corporate disclosure data was captured on the 
corporate disclosure checklist from the annual reports and websites of the companies in 
the two samples. Furthermore, with the help of the spreadsheet software, the captured 
data was analysed to find answers to the research questions. 
 
The rest of this chapter summarises the literature review chapters and the empirical 
evidence collected and then based on the findings of the study, conclusions and 
recommendations made on how to improve the quality of corporate disclosure in areas 
where it was found to be lacking. At the end of the chapter follows a discussion of the 
implications of the study which includes potential areas for further research. 
7.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
 
The literature review in chapters two to four, the research design and research findings in 
chapter five and chapter six respectively are summarised below. 
 
Chapter two started by explaining Mandatory corporate disclosure as disclosure in 
accordance with the GAAP or financial reporting. A brief historical development of 
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mandatory corporate disclosure followed next, covering its different forms including; 
primitive accounting, the double entry system, unregulated financial reporting, and 
ultimately regulated financial reporting which is to date the main source of corporate 
financial information. The purpose of each form was discussed as well as its limitations. 
 
The chapter went on to discuss two categories of theories on which modern financial 
reporting is based which are the Conceptual Framework, which prescribes accounting 
practice and  the category comprising of the theories that explain and predict accounting 
practice. The theories in the latter category include Agency Theory, Positive Accounting 
Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Legitimacy Theory. The chapter pinpointed the 
Conceptual Framework as the predominant theory of financial reporting. 
 
The Conceptual Framework was described as a set of accounting principles that provide a 
reference framework for evaluating accounting practice as well as for developing new 
accounting practices. The Agency Theory on the other hand, was described as a theory 
that holds that accounting practices are used to fight agency problems and information 
asymmetry; while Positive Accounting Theory was described as a theory that posits that 
the choice of accounting practices is influenced by cost and benefits involved in the 
transactions they measure. 
 
Further to the above, the Stakeholder Theory was described as a theory that posits that 
accounting practices are selected on the basis of their ability to provide accountability to 
the stakeholders; while the protection of corporate entities’ legitimacy was viewed as the 
essence of Legitimacy Theory. It was noted that the main argument of Legitimacy Theory 
was that corporate entities’ choice of accounting practices is influenced by the legitimacy 
gap they wish to narrow in order to protect their legitimacy. The chapter also 
acknowledged that although the Conceptual Framework is a predominant theory, the 
consensus is that there is no generally accepted theory of financial reporting, hence the 
need for a consolidated theory. 
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A brief review of the financial reporting environment in Botswana and South Africa was 
also given in this chapter. It revealed that financial reporting in both countries was based 
on the Conceptual Framework accounting standards; the currencies of the two countries 
are almost at par and the volume of cross border trade between the two countries is quite 
substantial. Furthermore, South Africa’s economy was described as the biggest in Africa, 
its securities exchange  one of the best in the world and its regulatory bodies and 
education system as more advanced than those of Botswana.  
 
Based on the IMF/World Bank reports on observance of standards and codes (ROSC) on 
both countries, that observed that corporate reporting was improving in both countries; 
without indicating the actual level of corporate disclosure and the areas that required 
improvement, the chapter examined various aspects of mandatory disclosure in order to 
gain the required insight into this type of disclosure rigor to undertaking the study. The 
aspects examined include: the history of financial reporting, the underlying theories of 
financial reporting and the financial reporting environment of the two countries. 
 
Chapter three examined contextual disclosure. It defined it as a voluntary disclosure of 
financial and non-financial information to complement corporate information produced 
by financial reporting, in order to meet the information needs of stakeholders and to 
achieve the entity’s strategic objectives. Then its evolution, its different forms, the 
theories underlying it and the state of contextual disclosure in Botswana and South Africa 
were discussed. 
 
Contextual disclosure was seen as having evolved incrementally over time through three 
forms, being voluntary disclosure of economic information, disclosure of corporate 
governance such as internal monitoring mechanisms, compliance with ethical codes, 
social and environmental performance; and sustainability reporting – the disclosure of 
economic, social and environmental performance. 
 
The theories and frameworks that underlie contextual disclosure were also examined. 
First the theories that explain and predict contextual disclosure were examined followed 
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by frameworks that prescribe how contextual disclosure should be. Agency Theory, the 
Stakeholder Theory and the Legitimacy Theory were cited as theories that explain and 
predict contextual disclosure while frameworks such the management commentary, 
theenhanced business reporting framework and the GRI Guidelines were described as the 
frameworks that prescribe how contextual disclosure should be. 
 
The Agency Theory was seen as a theory that proposes that contextual disclosures are 
made to mitigate agency costs. The Stakeholder Theory on the other hand, was explained 
to be a theory that proposes that contextual disclosure is made to deliver accountability to 
stakeholders, while Legitimacy Theory was seen to be a theory based on the premise that 
firms disclose contextual information in order to manage their operational legitimacy. A 
brief description of each framework was also given. 
 
The chapter ended with a brief review of the state of contextual disclosure in South 
Africa and Botswana. In the review, South Africa was described as among the developing 
countries that have made significant advances in contextual disclosure, citing the King III 
code of corporate governance, as one of the best codes in the world. The King III code 
together with the new South African Companies Act (2008), were viewed as a sound 
framework of contextual reporting in South Africa. 
 
Furthermore, the review cited a number of empirical studies on contextual disclosure  that 
have been conducted in South Africa on issues such as patterns, trends, informativeness 
and transformation of contextual disclosure. However, the review noted lack of literature 
on comparative contextual disclosure in South Africa. The chapter observed that lack of 
literature made it difficult to assess how South African listed companies’ contextual 
disclosure compare with that of companies in other countries. Further to the above, it was 
noted that in contrast to South Africa, Botswana’s code of corporate governance was 
found to be still in the making; but empirical studies and comparative studies were 
lacking. 
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In chapter four integrated reporting was defined as a reporting model by which financial 
and non-financial information is reported as a single package. It was noted that different 
media of communication may be used in integrated reporting including paper, internet, 
forums, panels and official launches. The contention by Professor King that integrated 
reporting does not render the separate reporting model useless was discussed briefly. 
 
The chapter cited the provision of a more holistic view of the information relevant to the 
company and its value proposition and strategy as the primary benefit of integrated 
reporting. But it also pointed out that there were secondary benefits of integrated 
reporting to the company, its stakeholders as well as to society as a whole; and argued 
that the business case for adopting integrated reporting were the disadvantages of the 
traditional reporting system and the benefits of integrated reporting. It was also pointed 
out that these advantages of integrated reporting were the reason why many listed 
companies in the developed countries were adopting integrated reporting, although, the 
actual rate of adoption of integrated reporting was not known. 
 
Another aspect of integrated reporting that chapter 4 covered was its implementation 
process. The process was regarded as a change management process, dealing on the one 
hand, with organisational issues and data capturing issues such as what data to capture 
and which metrics to use. 
 
Further to the above, the chapter acknowledged several initiatives that have evolved 
globally in promoting integrated reporting, including the King III Code of South Africa, 
the IRC of South Africa, the International Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC), and 
Global Reporting Initiate (GRI) as well as the Prince of Wales Accounting for 
Sustainability project. Individual countries such as South Africa, Denmark and the UK 
were also cited as having played a regulatory role in promoting integrated reporting. 
 
Chapter four also noted that in the Southern African region, South Africa was leading the 
way in integrated reporting. The King III code, The South African Companies Act, the 
IRC of South Africa and the Discussion Paper on integrated reporting were described as 
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milestones in integrated reporting in South Africa. The Discussion Paper, for example 
was described as, providing guidance to listed companies on how to approach integrated 
reporting. However, it was pointed out that the Discussion Paper does not address 
integrated management issues and that the Companies Act makes integrated reporting 
mandatory to all listed companies. 
 
According to KPMG (2011) and Deloitte (2011), efforts by JSE listed companies in 
adopting integrated reporting is remarkably encouraging, but the assurance of integrated 
reports remains relatively slow. However, for the rest of the region, particularly 
Botswana, there is no information about the state of integrated reporting or of its quality 
relative to that in South Africa. 
 
Lastly chapter four underscored the importance of comparative corporate disclosure in 
the present globalised world, by describing it as a means of benchmarking disclosure 
regimes against others with a view to improving the quality of disclosure. However, the 
chapter noted that as comparative study of corporate disclosure involving Botswana or 
South African listed companies was not possible because integrated reporting was no yet 
practiced in Botswana; the assessment of integrated reporting was to be confined to the 
South African companies. 
 
Chapter five explained the research process followed to benchmark the quality of 
corporate disclosure of listed companies in Botswana against those of South Africa. The 
process is described as involving: reviewing the literature, constructing a research 
instrument, selecting the samples of companies to study and conducting content analysis 
on the companies’ annual reports to assess the quality of corporate disclosure of for each 
selected item. Furthermore, the process is said to involve tabulating the data on the 
spreadsheets and then analysing it to establish the quality of corporate disclosure for each 
sample studied as well as the comparative level of corporate disclosure of the two 
samples. 
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The chapter described the research instrument used in this study as the corporate 
disclosure checklist; which is basically a list of questions designed to assess the quality of 
corporate disclosure; a “Yes’ response to which indicate disclosure while a “No’ response 
indicate non-disclosure. The chapter further shows that the quality of corporate disclosure 
would be expressed the percentage of items on the checklist disclosed by a company. 
 
Chapter five described that two research methods are used in the study being literature 
review and content analysis. Literature review was defined as a critical study of existing 
literature on the topic undertaken in order to avoid duplicating previous studies, to 
discover the most recent and authoritative theorising about the topic, to identify available 
instrumentation that have proven validity and reliability; to ensure that authoritative use 
is made of relevant textbooks, articles and dissertations and to identify the research gaps 
that can be filled by the current study. It also pointed out in this chapter that according to 
existing literature no comparative study on the quality of corporate disclosure between 
South Africa and Botswana existed; and this was a further justification of this study. 
 
The chapter noted that data for this study was drawn from two populations of companies: 
(i) companies listed on the Domestic Equity Board of the BSE and (ii) companies listed 
on the JSE. The chapter further indicated that all 23 companies listed on the Domestic 
Board of the BSE were to be studied while only the top 40 companies listed on the JSE 
were to be studied. It also stated the reason for including the top 40 companies listed on 
the JSE in the sample studied as to check how the disclosure quality of Botswana 
companies compares with the best companies on the JSE. The unit of study was 
identified as the annual report and website of each company for the periods ending in the 
calendar years 2010 and 2011. It was further noted that the annual reports of BSE listed 
companies were obtained from the companies’ head offices while those of the JSE listed 
companies were downloaded from their respective websites. 
 
The chapter also described the attempt that has been made to validate this study and to 
consider the ethical matters involved in the study. It made one observation, that lack of 
experts and the high cost of engaging experts to validate the research methodology made 
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a full validation of this study impossible; and noted this to be one of the limitations of 
this study. 
 
Chapter six discussed the findings of the study in terms of how the data captured was 
tabulated, classified, analysed and presented in percentages, charts and tables with the 
help of the spreadsheet software. The chapter also explained how the findings are 
presented for companies in the two samples as well as in terms of comparative analysis 
and integrated reporting. 
 
The chapter showed that the level of overall corporate disclosure of the BSE sample was 
generally low in both years and varied among the different sectors to which companies in 
the BSE sample fell. The Consumer Services Sector was cited as topping the sectors 
while the Healthcare sector trailed the sectors in both years.. 
 
Furthermore, chapter six showed the level of disclosure for each of three major categories 
of corporate information. The financial information category was found to be the best 
disclosed category while the corporate governance and sustainability categories were 
found to be poorly disclosed. It was also found that within the financial information 
category, financial highlights were the most disclosed items while significant financial 
assistance to and from government and policies, practices and proportion of spending on 
local based supplies were the least disclosed items. Another finding described in chapter 
six is that the governance of IT and governance of risks were the least disclosed items 
within the corporate governance category while within the sustainability performance 
category the analysis found all the items poorly disclosed. 
 
In the case of companies in the JSE sample, chapter six found the level of overall 
corporate disclosure high in both years and in all sectors to which the companies in the 
sample fell. The only exception was the Consumer Services Sector which had a moderate 
level of overall corporate disclosure. A further finding was that, almost all corporate 
information categories were highly disclosed and the disclosure levels increased over the 
period as well as across the different sectors to which the information categories belong. 
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However, it was noted that some of the information items within the different information 
categories, experienced low levels of disclosure. 
 
The chapter found that comparatively, companies in the JSE sample had a higher level of 
corporate disclosure, overall, across corresponding sectors as well as within the different 
information categories and items. The chapter also noted that integrated reporting was 
practiced by companies within the JSE sample and that the level of disclosure was low in 
2010 but was significantly high in 2011, although there was room for improvement. 
 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
 
As indicated in chapter one this research study was motivated by the observation of the 
IMF/World Bank(2006) that corporate reporting in Botswana was low in spite of some 
improvement during the previous years. As the IMF/World Bank report failed to show 
what the level of corporate disclosure was and the areas that required improvement, this 
research study was embarked on to seek answers to three research questions: 
• What was the level of corporate disclosure in Botswana? 
• How did it compare with that of South African companies? 
• What lessons can be learnt? 
Accordingly, the research was conducted by means of literature review and an empirical 
study involving 23 companies listed on the BSE and the top 40 companies listed on the 
JSE, for the calendar years 2010 and 2011. The study indicated that the overall level of 
corporate disclosure of the BSE companies was low during the period of the study, but 
increased slightly. Furthermore, the study indicated low levels of corporate disclosure 
across the Industrial Sectors as well as within the major categories of corporate 
information and for some specific pieces of corporate information; in both years. The 
study also indicated that although integrated reporting has been around for a couple of 
years it was not practised at all by the BSE companies. 
 
Although the findings of this research study are on the whole consistent with those of the 
IMF/World Bank, this study indicated specifically that the level of overall corporate 
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disclosure was 37% in 2010 and 40% in 2011 in the BSE sample. The study further 
indicated that the level of overall corporate disclosure was very low in the Healthcare  
Sector; and further indicated low levels of disclosure within the corporate governance and 
sustainability performance information categories. The relatively high level of disclosure 
of the financial information category was not unexpected given its mandatory nature. 
Nevertheless, the study indicated low disclosure levels within the financial information 
category for the following items: favourable audit opinion, financial highlights, going 
concern status, value added, assistance to and from government as well as policies, 
practices and proportion spent on local supplies. 
 
There are possible explanations for the low levels of corporate disclosure. Corporate 
disclosure is supposed to be market driven, that is driven by the forces of demand and 
supply in a perfect market environment. Since market failure is inevitable as discussed 
earlier in this study , regulation remains important for enforcing corporate disclosure. But 
in Botswana corporate reporting regulations relate to financial reporting only. Thus the 
low level of disclosure of corporate information can be said to be attributable to 
ineffective regulatory systems. The regulatory systems referred to here are not just those 
directly relating to corporate reporting, rather they include regulations that impact 
indirectly on corporate disclosure including training regulators, professional accounting 
bodies as well as the companies and stock exchange regulation and related enforcement 
mechanisms.  
 
Furthermore, in line with the Agency Theory regulations traditionally tend to address the 
information asymmetry affecting shareholders and creditors only, rather than those of all 
stakeholders. Accordingly existing regulations do not require companies to disclose non-
financial corporate information such as corporate governance and sustainability 
performance which are required by stakeholders. The voluntary disclosure nature of non-
financial information is thus the second reason for low level of disclosure by the BSE 
companies. Unfortunately, apart from the auditor’s report which assesses the quality of 
disclosed financial information, there is no comprehensive index of corporate disclosure 
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to compel companies to disclose non-financial information such as corporate governance 
and sustainability performance.  
 
The study indicated that comparatively companies in the JSE sample had a higher level of 
corporate disclosure than those in the BSE sample in both years; and that the difference 
in the levels of corporate disclosure was across corresponding sectors as well as within 
major information categories and information items. The study also indicated that 
whereas companies in the JSE sample had adopted integrated reporting, those in the BSE 
sample had not. 
 
These findings suggest that the top 40 JSE companies publish corporate information that 
is more useful than that published by the BSE companies; which means that other things 
equal, users of corporate information published by the JSE companies make more 
informed decision than users of corporate information published by the BSE companies. 
 
Ideally though, the theories discussed in this research study are supposed to explain 
corporate disclosure equally in both samples. Yet the findings show that they explained 
corporate disclosure more in the JSE sample than in the BSE sample. It follows although 
the corporate disclosure level of the JSE companies is benchmarkable; the starting point 
in the benchmarking exercise should be an examination of the reasons why the theories 
discussed in this research study failed to explain corporate disclosure in the BSE 
companies. 
 
As far as this study is concerned, all theories apply when other things are equal – the 
ceteris paribus proviso. The fact that Botswana is near to South Africa does not make it 
the same as South Africa. There are economic, cultural, technological and even historical 
differences between the two countries. These are the causes of the differences in the level 
of corporate disclosure. If these differences explain the differences in the levels of 
corporate disclosure then Contingency Theory also explain corporate disclosure. 
Contingency Theory is a behavioural theory which posits that management action 
depends on the situation it faces. 
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7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.5.1 Adopt a useful classification of corporate information 
 
Traditionally researchers and corporate analysts tended to classify corporate information 
into mandatory and voluntary categories. Literature review in this study indicated that 
corporate information which used to be categorised as voluntary disclosure has become 
mandatory and the companies now report corporate information under three categories of 
financial information, corporate governance and sustainability. This recommendation 
applies to companies  and  the academia of  Botswana and South Africa.. 
 
A few companies use the classification: financial information and sustainability on the 
ground that corporate governance is an aspect of sustainability information. The three 
categories classification used in this study is recommended on the grounds that it permits 
a more detailed analysis of corporate information than the two category classification. 
7.5.2 Benchmark on markets with similar characteristics 
 
The objective of this study was to compare the levels of corporate disclosure in the two 
stock exchanges with a view to establishing if companies with lower levels of corporate 
disclosure could learn from those with higher levels. This study has shown that a mere 
finding that companies in a particular exchange have a higher level of corporate 
disclosure is not a criterion in selecting companies to benchmark on. This is because the 
difference in the levels of corporate disclosure may be due differences in regulatory 
requirements as well as the maturity of the  markets, in which case the best way to 
improve corporate disclosure would be to iron out differences in these two  underlying 
factors. 
7.5.3 Companies to use separate interlinked and focused  reports, and websites when 
reporting 
 
The study indicated that companies in the JSE sample reported through separate 
interlinked financial, corporate governance and sustainability information categories in an 
integrated manner. As this could be one of the reasons these companies had a higher level 
of disclosure than the BSE companies, which tended to report through one report – the 
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annual report; it is recommended that companies experiencing low levels of disclosure 
adopt this approach. 
7.5.4 Introduce a corporate disclosure index 
 
Indices have been used for years to rank financial markets; and recently they are being 
used to rank how companies and even countries perform in some areas of interest. There 
are economic indices, corruption indices as well as social responsibility indices. This 
study indicated that companies in the JSE sample are legally required to comply with the 
social responsibility index and this is a possible explanation for their high level of 
disclosure of corporate governance and sustainability performance. The BSE could 
introduce a similar index in order to improve its sustainability disclosure and eventually 
introduce integrated reporting. 
7.5.5 Improve the disclosure of governance of IT and governance of risks 
 
This study showed that the level of corporate disclosure of governance of IT and 
governance of risks were very low in both samples. An investigation should be 
undertaken to establish the causes of such low level of disclosure. 
7.5.6 Introduce balanced CPD programmes and accounting training curricula 
 
The CPD programmes of national accountancy organisations and accounting curricula of 
tertiary institutions should be reviewed in order to ensure that corporate governance and 
sustainability reporting, are be included in the accounting training curricula. The current 
curricula are biased towards financial reporting, if they are not changed the problem of 
poor disclosure of non-financial information may become perpetual. 
 
7.6 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This study raises a number of issues that require further research in order to understand 
why the theories of corporate reporting failed to explain corporate disclosure in some 
markets. The following possible areas for future research are proposed. 
• Does the Contingency Theory also explain corporate disclosure? This is a behavioural 
theory which posits that management action depend on the situation the face. Before 
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conclusion is reached the following hypothesis will have to be tested: ‘The situation 
the reporter finds himself/herself in influences the level of corporate disclosure.’ 
• As stated above, some information that used to be classified as voluntary is now 
mandatory. Future research could establish the costs and benefits of mandating 
voluntary disclosure. 
• A study could be undertaken to establish the viability of a national corporate 
disclosure index. As stated above, such an index may motivate companies to improve 
their levels of corporate disclosure in order to protect their image. 
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APPENDIX A: CORPORATE DISCLOSURE CHECKLIST 
1.0 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION Y/N/ 
n/a 
Y/N/ 
n/a 
1.1 Is the corporate annual report the traditional report type?   
1.2 Is the auditor’s opinion on financial statements qualified or unqualified ?   
1.3 Does the corporate annual report disclose financial highlights?   
1.4 Is there disclosure whether the company is a going concern or not; and if 
not a going concern, the steps being taken by the company to remedy the 
situation? 
  
1.5 Does the corporate annual report disclose the economic value generated 
and distributed by the company or explain why it is not disclosed? 
  
1.6 Does the corporate annual report disclose significant financial assistance 
received from or given to the Government? 
  
1.7 Does the corporate annual report disclose policies, practices and 
proportion of spending on local based supplies? 
  
2.0 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE   
2.1 Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship   
2.1.1 Is there disclosure that there is effective leadership based on ethical 
foundation or an explanation why there is no disclosure? 
  
2.1.2 Is there disclosure that there is responsible corporate citizenship or an 
explanation why there is no disclosure? 
  
2.2 Boards and directors   
2.2.1 Does the report disclose that strategy, risk and performance and 
sustainability are inseparable or explain why there is no disclosure? 
  
2.2.2 Does the report disclose that the chairman of the Board is an 
independent non- executive director or explain why there is no 
disclosure?  
  
2.2.3 Does the report disclose that the Board comprises of a balance of power 
with a majority of non-executive directors who are independent; or 
explain why there is no disclosure? 
  
2.2.4 Does the report disclose that regular performance appraisals of the 
board, its committees and individual directors are conducted or explain 
why there is no disclosure? 
  
2.4.5 Is there disclosure that there are well-structured committees and 
oversight of key functions or an explanation why there is no disclosure? 
  
2.4.6 Does the report disclose the existence of an agreed governance 
framework between the group and its subsidiary boards or explain why 
there is no disclosure? 
  
2.4.7 Does the report disclose that the company’s remuneration policy is 
approved by its stakeholders or explains why there is no such 
disclosure? 
  
2.3 Internal audit– does the report disclose the following or explain why 
they are not disclosed: 
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2.3.1 Is there disclosure of a presence of an effective risk-based internal 
control or an explanation why there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.3.2 Does the report disclose that a written assessment of the effectiveness of 
the company’s system of internal controls and risk management is 
presented to the board or an explanation of why there is no such 
disclosure? 
  
2.4 Audit committee   
2.4.1 Does the report disclose that the committee is effective and independent 
or explain why there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.4.2 Does the report disclose that the committee is chaired by an independent 
non –executive director or explain why there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.4.3 Does the report disclose that the committee oversees corporate reporting 
or explain why there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.4.4 Is there disclosure that the committee evaluates the appropriateness of 
the combined assurance model to improve the efficiency in assurance 
activities or an explanation why there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.4.5 Is there disclosure that he committee oversees internal audit, or an 
explanation why there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.4.6 Does the report disclose that the committee is integral to the risk 
management process or explain why there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.4.7 Does the report disclose that the committee oversees the external audit 
process? 
  
2.4.8 Is there disclosure that the committee reports to the board and 
shareholders on how it has displayed its duties or an explanation why 
there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.5 Compliance with laws, codes, rules and standards   
2.5.1 Does the report disclose that the board ensures that the company 
complies with the relevant laws or explain why there is no such 
disclosure? 
  
2.5.2 Does the report disclose that compliance risk forms part of the 
company’s risk management process or explain why there is no such 
disclosure? 
  
2.5.3 Is there disclosure that the Board has delegated to management the 
implementation of an effective compliance framework and process or an 
explanation why there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.6 Governance of Information Technology (IT)   
2.6.1 Does the report disclose that the Board is responsible for IT governance 
or explain why there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.6.2 Is there disclosure that the IT governance framework includes relevant 
structures or explain why there is no such disclosure? 
  
2.6.3 Does the report disclose that Management is responsible for the 
implementation of an IT governance framework or explain why there is 
no such disclosure? 
  
2.6.4 Does the report disclose that the Board monitors and evaluates 
significant IT investment and expenditure or explain why there is no 
such disclosure? 
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2.6.5 Is there disclosure that the Audit Committee assists the Board in 
carrying out its IT oversight responsibilities or an explanation why there 
is no such disclosure? 
  
2.7 Governance of risk-does the report disclose the following or explain 
why they are not disclosed: 
  
2.7.1 The Board is responsible for governance of risk and setting levels of risk 
tolerance? 
  
2.7.2 The Risk management Committee assists the Board in carrying out its 
risk responsibilities? 
  
2.7.3 The Board delegates the process of risk management to management?   
2.7.4 The Board ensures that risk assessments and monitoring is performed on 
a continuous basis? 
  
2.7.5 Framework and methodology are in place to increase the probability of 
anticipating unpredictable risks? 
  
2.7.6 Management implements appropriate responses to risk?   
2.7.7 The Board receives assurance on the effectiveness of the risk 
management process? 
  
2.7.8 Risk disclosure is made to stakeholders?   
3.0 SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE   
3.1 Company profile – does the corporate report disclose:   
3.1.1 Company name?   
3.1.2 Nature of ownership and legal form?   
3.1.3 Where it operates?   
3.1.4 Its primary brands, products and services?   
3.1.5 Its operational structure?   
3.1.6 The countries where it operates?   
3.1.7 The location of the company’s headquarters?   
3.1.8 The market it serves?   
3.1.9 Scale of the reporting company?   
3.2 Sustainability report format   
3.2.1 Does it comprise of separate financial and sustainability sections only?   
3.2.2 Is it independently assured?   
3.3 Forward-looking information   
3.3.1 Is there disclosure of the business model?   
3.3.2 Is there disclosure of corporate strategy?   
3.3.3 Are targets and KPI disclosed?   
3.3.4 Is there disclosure of any other forward-looking information?   
3.3.5 Is there a link between strategy, risks, KPIs and targets?   
3.4 Social performance – does the report  disclose the following issues or 
explain why they are not disclosed: 
  
3.4.1 HR Policy?   
3.4.2 HIV&AIDS and occupational health?   
3.4.3 Safety of employees?   
3.4.4 Employee empowerment?   
3.4.5 Fair employment practices?   
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3.4.6 Support for employees’ unions?   
3.4.7 Fair labour practices?   
3.4.8 Community activities?   
3.5 Environmental performance – does the reports disclose the following 
issues or explain why they are not disclosed: 
  
3.5.1 Material wastes and spills?   
3.5.2 Climate change?   
3.5.3 Water?   
3.5.4 Energy?   
3.5.5 Emission?   
3.5.6 Biodiversity?   
3.6 Governing stakeholder relationships – does the report disclose the 
following or explain why they are not disclosed: 
  
3.6.1 Stakeholders’ perceptions affect a company’s reputation (value)?   
3.6.2 Stakeholders are continuously identified and engaged?   
3.6.3 There is transparent and effective communication to stakeholders?   
4.0 INTEGRATED REPORTING   
4.1 Is the annual report integrated?   
4.2 Does the integrated report comprise of linked separate, economic, 
governance and sustainability reports? 
  
4.3 Is the board responsible for integration of the company’s sustainability 
reporting and disclosure with the company’s financial reporting? 
  
4.4 Does the integrated report include commentary on the company’s 
financial results which enables stakeholders to assess the company’s 
economic value? 
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APPENDIX B: RESPONSES TO CHECKLIST QUESTIONS BY BSE COMPANIES 
 
BSE COMPANIES’ RESPONSE TO CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
CHECKLIST IN 2010 
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1. Economic/Financial 
1.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
1.2 N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 20 3 
1.3 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 21 2 
1.4 Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 18 5 
1.5 Y Y Y N Y Y N N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N Y 14 9 
1.6 N N Y N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N 2 21 
1.7 N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N 1 22 
2. Corporate governance   
2.1 Ethical leadership   
2.1.1 N Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N N N 9 14 
2.1.2 N N Y N N N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N N N 7 16 
2.2 Board of directors   
2.2.1 N Y N N N N Y Y N N N N N Y N N N N N Y Y Y N 7 16 
2.2.2 N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y 17 6 
2.2.3 N Y Y N N N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N N Y N Y Y 12 11 
2.2.4 N N Y N N N N Y N Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N N Y N 7 16 
2.2.5 N N Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y 13 10 
2.2.6 N N N N N N N Y N N N N N Y N N N N N N N Y N 3 20 
2.2.7 N N N N N N N Y N Y Y Y N Y N N N N N N N Y N 6 17 
2.3 Internal audit   
2.3.1 N N Y N N N Y Y N Y N Y N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y 9 14 
2.3.2 N N N N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y 9 14 
2.4 Audit committee   
2.4.1 N N Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y 12 11 
2.4.2 N Y N N N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y 13 10 
2.4.3 N N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y 14 9 
2.4.4 N N N N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 5 18 
2.4.5 N Y Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y 11 12 
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BSE COMPANIES’ RESPONSE TO CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
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2.4.6 N N Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N N Y Y 11 12 
2.4.7 N Y Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N N Y Y 12 11 
2.4.8 N N Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N N N N Y Y 10 13 
2.5 Compliance   
2.5.1 N Y Y N Y N Y Y N N N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y 11 12 
2.5.2 N N Y N N N Y Y N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 7 16 
2.5.3 N N Y N N N Y Y N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 7 16 
2.6 Governance of IT   
2.6.1 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
2.6.2 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
2.6.3 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
2.6.4 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
2.6.5 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
2.7 Governance of risks   
2.7.1 N N Y N N N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y 9 14 
2.7.2 N N Y N N N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y 9 14 
2.7.3 N N Y N N N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y Y N N N N Y Y 8 15 
2.7.4 N N Y N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 4 19 
2.7.5 N N Y N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 5 18 
2.7.6 N N Y N N N N Y N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 6 17 
2.7.7 N N Y N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 4 19 
2.7.8 N N Y N N N N Y N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 6 17 
3. Sustainability   
3.1 Company profile   
3.1.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.5 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.9 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.2 Report format   
3.2.1 N Y N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N N N N 7 16 
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3.2.2 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
3.3 Forward-looking   
3.3.1 N N Y Y N N N Y N N N N N Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y 8 15 
3.3.2 N N N N N N N Y Y N Y N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 7 16 
3.3.3 N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N N N Y N Y Y 5 18 
3.3.4 N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N 3 20 
3.3.5 N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N 2 21 
3.4 Social impact   
3.4.1 N Y Y N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N 4 19 
3.4.2 N Y N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N Y N N 3 20 
3.4.3 N N N N N N N Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N Y N N 3 20 
3.4.4 N Y Y N N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N N N N Y N N 5 18 
3.4.5 N N Y N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N Y N N 3 20 
3.4.6 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
3.4.7 N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N 2 21 
3.4.8 N Y Y N N N N Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N 4 19 
3.5 Environmental impact   
3.5.1 N N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y Y N N N N N N N N 3 20 
3.5.2 N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N 1 22 
3.5.3 N N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N N N 2 21 
3.5.4 N N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N N N 2 21 
3.5.5 N N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N N N 2 21 
3.5.6 N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N 1 22 
3.6 Stakeholder relationship   
3.6.1 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
3.6.2 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
3.6.3 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
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1. Economic/Financial 
1.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
1.2 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 20 3 
1.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 22 1 
1.4 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y N N Y Y Y Y 17 6 
1.5 N N Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N 7 16 
1.6 N N Y N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N 2 21 
1.7 N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N 1 22 
2. Corporate governance 
2.1  Ethical leadership   
2.1.1 Y Y Y N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N Y N N N N N N Y Y 10 13 
2.1.2 Y Y Y N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N Y N N N N N N N N 8 15 
2.2  Board of directors   
2.2.1 Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N Y Y Y N 6 17 
2.2.2 Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 15 8 
2.2.3 Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 12 11 
2.2.4 Y N Y N Y N N N N Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N N Y N 8 15 
2.2.5 Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 12 11 
2.2.6 N N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N Y N 3 20 
2.2.7 Y N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N N N N Y N 8 15 
2.3  Internal audit   
2.3.1 Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y 11 12 
2.3.2 Y N N N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y 10 13 
2.4  Audit committee   
2.4.1 Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y 14 9 
2.4.2 Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y 15 8 
2.4.3 Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y 13 10 
2.4.4 N N N N Y N N N N N N N N Y Y N Y N N N N Y Y 6 17 
2.4.5 Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y 12 11 
2.4.6 Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y 11 12 
2.4.7 Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N N Y Y 13 10 
2.4.8 Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N N Y Y 12 11 
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2.5  Compliance   
2.5.1 Y N Y N Y N Y Y N N N Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y 12 11 
2.5.2 Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 8 15 
2.5.3 Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N N N N N N N Y Y 8 15 
2.6  Governance of IT   
2.6.1 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
2.6.2 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
2.6.3 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
2.6.4 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
2.6.5 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 23 
2.7  Governance of risks   
2.7.1 Y N Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 9 14 
2.7.2 Y N Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 9 14 
2.7.3 Y N Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 9 14 
2.7.4 N N Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 8 15 
2.7.5 N N Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 8 15 
2.7.6 Y N Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 9 14 
2.7.7 Y N Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 9 14 
2.7.8 Y N Y N Y N N Y N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y 8 15 
3. Sustainability 
3.1  Company profile   
3.1.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.5 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.1.9 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 23 0 
3.2  Report format   
3.2.1 Y Y N N Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N N N N N 9 14 
3.2.2 N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 1 22 
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3.3  Forward-looking   
3.3.1 Y N Y Y N N N N N N N N N Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 9 14 
3.3.2 Y N Y N N N N Y N Y Y N N N N N N N N Y Y Y N 8 15 
3.3.3 Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y 3 20 
3.3.4 Y N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N 3 20 
3.3.5 Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N 2 21 
3.4  Social impact   
3.4.1 N Y Y N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N Y N N 5 18 
3.4.2 Y Y N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N Y N N 5 18 
3.4.3 Y N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N Y Y N 5 18 
3.4.4 Y N Y N N N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y N 7 16 
3.4.5 Y N Y N N N N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y N 6 17 
3.4.6 N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y Y N 3 20 
3.4.7 Y N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N 3 20 
3.4.8 Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N Y N Y N N N N N N Y N N 7 16 
3.5  Environmental impact   
3.5.1 N N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N N N 2 21 
3.5.2 N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N 1 22 
3.5.3 N N N N N N N N N N N y N Y N N N N N N N N N 2 21 
3.5.4 N N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N N N 2 21 
3.5.5 N N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N N N N 2 21 
3.5.6 N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N 1 22 
3.6  Stakeholder relationship   
3.6.1 Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 2 21 
3.6.2 Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 1 22 
3.6.3 Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 1 22 
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1. Economic / Financial 
1.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
1.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
1.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
1.4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
1.5 Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 31 9 
1.6 Y N N Y Y Y Y N N Y N N Y N N N N Y N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y N N N N N Y N N N N 12 28 
1.7 Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y N Y N 20 20 
2. Governance 
2.1 Ethical leadership 
2.1.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
2.1.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 39 1 
2.2 Board of directors 
2.2.1 Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 32 8 
2.2.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 38 2 
2.2.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 39 1 
2.2.4 Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 32 8 
2.2.5 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 37 3 
2.2.6 Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 31 9 
2.2.7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 38 2 
2.3 Internal audit 
2.3.1 Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 32 8 
2.3.2 Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 32 8 
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2.4 Audit committee 
2.4.1 N N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 31 9 
2.4.2 N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 30 10 
2.4.3 N N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 31 9 
2.4.4 N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y 26 14 
2.4.5 N N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 31 9 
2.4.6 N N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 30 10 
2.4.7 N N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 31 9 
2.4.8 N N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 31 9 
2.5 Compliance 
2.5.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 36 4 
2.5.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.5.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.6 Governance of IT 
2.6.1 N N N N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N Y Y N 13 27 
2.6.2 N N N N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N Y Y N 13 27 
2.6.3 N N N N Y N N N Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N Y Y N 12 28 
2.6.4 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y N N Y N N N N Y N N Y N N N N N N N N N Y N N N Y Y N 9 31 
2.6.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y N N Y N N N N Y N N Y N N N N N N N N N Y N N N Y Y N 9 31 
2.7 Governance of risks 
2.7.1 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 32 8 
2.7.2 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 32 8 
2.7.3 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 33 7 
2.7.4 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 32 8 
2.7.5 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 31 9 
2.7.6 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 32 8 
2.7.7 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 32 8 
2.7.8 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 33 7 
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3. Sustainability 
3.1 Company profile 
3.1.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.5 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.9 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.2 Report format 
3.2.1 Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 32 8 
3.2.2 Y Y N N Y Y Y N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N 7 33 
3.3 Forward-looking 
3.3.1 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 34 6 
3.3.2 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 33 7 
3.3.3 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 26 14 
3.3.4 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 30 10 
3.3.5 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 26 14 
3.4 Social impact 
3.4.1 N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y N N N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N 24 16 
3.4.2 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y 29 11 
3.4.3 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y 29 11 
3.4.4 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y 27 13 
3.4.5 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y 27 13 
3.4.6 N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N Y Y N Y 22 18 
3.4.7 N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y 25 15 
3.4.8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N 30 10 
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3.5 Environmental impact 
3.5.1 N Y N N Y N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N N N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N 19 21 
3.5.2 Y Y N N Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y N N N Y Y N N 19 21 
3.5.3 N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N 23 17 
3.5.4 N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N 23 17 
3.5.5 Y Y N N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N 22 18 
3.5.6 Y Y N N N N N N Y N N Y N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N Y N N N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N 11 29 
3.6 Stakeholder relationship 
3.6.1 Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y N 26 14 
3.6.2 Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y N N Y Y Y N 25 15 
3.6.3 Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y N N Y Y Y N 25 15 
4. Integrated reporting 
4.1 Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y 21 19 
4.2 Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y 21 19 
4.3 Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y 21 19 
4.4 Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y 21 19 
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1. Economic / Financial 
1.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
1.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
1.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
1.4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
1.5 Y Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 29 11 
1.6 N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y N Y Y N N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y N N N 17 23 
1.7 N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 27 13 
2. Governance 
2.1 Ethical leadership 
2.1.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 37 3 
2.1.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 37 3 
2.2 Board of directors 
2.2.1 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 34 6 
2.2.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 37 3 
2.2.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 37 3 
2.2.4 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.2.5 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.2.6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 37 3 
2.2.7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.3 Internal audit 
2.3.1 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y 33 7 
2.3.2 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y 33 7 
2.4 Audit committee 
2.4.1 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.4.2 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.4.3 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 33 7 
2.4.4 Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 33 7 
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2.4.5 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.4.6 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.4.7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 36 4 
2.4.8 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.5 Compliance 
2.5.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 37 3 
2.5.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 36 4 
2.5.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 36 4 
2.6 Governance of IT 
2.6.1 N N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N Y Y N 14 26 
2.6.2 N N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N Y Y N 14 26 
2.6.3 N N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N Y Y N 14 26 
2.6.4 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N Y Y N 13 27 
2.6.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N Y Y N 13 27 
2.7 Governance of risks 
2.7.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 34 6 
2.7.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.7.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 35 5 
2.7.4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 34 6 
2.7.5 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 34 6 
2.7.6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 34 6 
2.7.7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 36 4 
2.7.8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 36 4 
3. Sustainability 
3.1 Company profile 
3.1.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
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3.1.5 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.1.9 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 0 
3.2 Report format 
3.2.1 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y N Y N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N 19 21 
3.2.2 Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y N Y N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N 13 27 
3.3 Forward-looking 
3.3.1 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 34 6 
3.3.2 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 33 7 
3.3.3 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 30 10 
3.3.4 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 32 8 
3.3.5 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 29 11 
3.4 Social impact 
3.4.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N 27 13 
3.4.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 30 10 
3.4.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 30 10 
3.4.4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 31 9 
3.4.5 Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y N N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N N Y Y Y Y 25 15 
3.4.6 Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N N Y N Y N N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 26 14 
3.4.7 Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y N N Y N Y N N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N 25 15 
3.4.8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 32 8 
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3.5 Environmental impact 
3.5.1 Y N N N Y N Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y 24 16 
3.5.2 Y N N N Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N N N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y 22 18 
3.5.3 Y N N N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y 25 15 
3.5.4 Y N N N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y 26 14 
3.5.5 Y N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y 27 13 
3.5.6 Y N N N Y N Y N Y Y N N N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N Y Y N Y 15 25 
3.6 Stakeholder relationship 
3.6.1 Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 31 9 
3.6.2 Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 31 9 
3.6.3 Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 31 9 
4. Integrated reporting 
4.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 36 4 
4.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y 35 5 
4.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y 35 5 
4.4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y 35 5 
 
